I’ve been thinking a lot about how to define music. How should we differentiate what constitutes music versus sound – as in what we call noise. The problem as I see it, is that it is all subjective and culturally influenced. How do we contextually structure or frame music to exclude “noise” or “sound” in a way that is inclusive of all cultures and all individuals? Some people would consider the sound produced by a train chugging on its journey as unpleasant noise, others will consider the same sound as rhythmic, comforting, and yes, musical.
I tried looking at purpose as a way to differentiate music from noise. Music, as the sound of our words as language, is meant to communicate something – joy, sadness, patriotism, relaxation – as lyrics in songs, it adds intensity to our stories. Music can be created with the specific intent to elicit a specific response, but so can language and all forms of artistic expression.
Can authorship be used as criteria to distinguish music from sound/noise? Is humankind the only beings capable of creating music? My thoughts immediately flew to birds/ songs, whales’ songs, wolves’ singing – all created beautiful music. Does their purpose for singing make it less musical? This led me to wonder if all living creatures make music. A bee buzzing, a mosquito humming – these are sounds we can hear, and subjectively some people would consider them part of the chorus of nature. So, do worms, clams, or fish produce sounds inaudible to the human ear, or currently beyond our technological ability (or interest) to measure?
What about wind as it rustles the leaves of the trees? What about the cadence of rain falling on a resonating surface? If it falls on an absorbing surface, would we still hear a rhythm? There is the babbling brook, waves crashing against the shore, horses’ hooves on a hard packed surface, a clock ticking.
Is it the created sound that defines it as music, or are the receptors within a being that declare it music?
Monday, January 26, 2009
Wednesday, December 10, 2008
James Rachels' "Created From Animals"
In his book, Rachels addressed societal key questions of the day. He discussed topics of moral and ethical dilemmas that are still relevant to today’s society, as well as our Environmental Ethics course.
He examines speciesism, racism, anthropomorphism and the relevance of evolution, creationism and human dignity, principle of equality, “subject of a life”, the connection between Darwinism and moral individualism, value of human life, right to life, rethinking the moral status of non-human animals, animal rights, vivisection, vegetarianism, and “subjects of biographical lives.” He references the key philosophical authors of many of these terms and compares and contrasts their theories with his own and Darwin’s.
Rachels examines the relationship between morality and reason, the duty to relieve both human and animal suffering which he offers as an offers an argument for vegetarianism, the independence of morality from religion, the right to life, and the role of ethics in a democratic society.
The first 56 pages of the book are a mini-biography of Darwin's life and work, which I really enjoyed. I found his presentation of Stephen Jay Gould’s speculation on the affect Captain FitzRoy had on Darwin’s character and philosophy deeply provoking.
I was also intrigued with the topic of suicide in relation to value, and Kant’s view of suicide as a “violation of the nobility of human nature… degrading it below the level of animal nature…destroys it.” While I agree with him that euthanasia and suicide are justified in sufficiently dire cases, I fear that in practice, this could lead to a resurgence of eugenics, with dire consequences for all living beings.
According to James Rachels, the idea of human dignity is a relic of pre-Darwinian thought. Before Darwin human elitism was religiously defended with “man is made in the image of God and man is a uniquely rational being.'' Rachels’ thesis expands beyond Darwin’s writing, ''Man in his arrogance thinks himself a great work, worthy the interposition of a deity. More humble and I believe true to consider him created from animals.''
Rachels’ thesis denies the unique rationality of humans and supports raising the moral status of nonhumans. However, because he believes there are large differences between human and nonhuman animals he supports different treatment of human and nonhuman animals. He believes that if we are going to treat a nonhuman differently from a human, we have to specifically relate the distinctions relevant to that treatment.
This is an area of weakness in Rachels’ theory. His theory does not provide the necessary and sufficient criteria for assigning value, and this interferes with logical determinations on the subject. He left the moral status of nonhuman animals definitely elevated, but he fails to furnish definitive clarity on the moral status of nonhuman and human animals.
Rachels' book is relevant to Environmental Ethics and provided a review of topics from my other philosophy courses. It also seems like a natural foundation for the theory of value incrementalism to naturally evolve into a new view of morality.
He examines speciesism, racism, anthropomorphism and the relevance of evolution, creationism and human dignity, principle of equality, “subject of a life”, the connection between Darwinism and moral individualism, value of human life, right to life, rethinking the moral status of non-human animals, animal rights, vivisection, vegetarianism, and “subjects of biographical lives.” He references the key philosophical authors of many of these terms and compares and contrasts their theories with his own and Darwin’s.
Rachels examines the relationship between morality and reason, the duty to relieve both human and animal suffering which he offers as an offers an argument for vegetarianism, the independence of morality from religion, the right to life, and the role of ethics in a democratic society.
The first 56 pages of the book are a mini-biography of Darwin's life and work, which I really enjoyed. I found his presentation of Stephen Jay Gould’s speculation on the affect Captain FitzRoy had on Darwin’s character and philosophy deeply provoking.
I was also intrigued with the topic of suicide in relation to value, and Kant’s view of suicide as a “violation of the nobility of human nature… degrading it below the level of animal nature…destroys it.” While I agree with him that euthanasia and suicide are justified in sufficiently dire cases, I fear that in practice, this could lead to a resurgence of eugenics, with dire consequences for all living beings.
According to James Rachels, the idea of human dignity is a relic of pre-Darwinian thought. Before Darwin human elitism was religiously defended with “man is made in the image of God and man is a uniquely rational being.'' Rachels’ thesis expands beyond Darwin’s writing, ''Man in his arrogance thinks himself a great work, worthy the interposition of a deity. More humble and I believe true to consider him created from animals.''
Rachels’ thesis denies the unique rationality of humans and supports raising the moral status of nonhumans. However, because he believes there are large differences between human and nonhuman animals he supports different treatment of human and nonhuman animals. He believes that if we are going to treat a nonhuman differently from a human, we have to specifically relate the distinctions relevant to that treatment.
This is an area of weakness in Rachels’ theory. His theory does not provide the necessary and sufficient criteria for assigning value, and this interferes with logical determinations on the subject. He left the moral status of nonhuman animals definitely elevated, but he fails to furnish definitive clarity on the moral status of nonhuman and human animals.
Rachels' book is relevant to Environmental Ethics and provided a review of topics from my other philosophy courses. It also seems like a natural foundation for the theory of value incrementalism to naturally evolve into a new view of morality.
Monday, December 8, 2008
Applying the theory of “value incrementalism” to Environmental Ethics
Value incrementalism could be very useful in determining best use practices and solutions in situations where there is conflict between parties regarding the needs of an individual animal, or a specie, or species, or an ecosystem. Obviously, conflict use most often arises relative to the desires of human animals. The impact of conflict use is normally most detrimental to disenfranchised human animals and all other nonhuman animals and the shared environmental resources within or influenced by the community in question and the planet in general. It could be applied in situations when the desires of humankind are in direct conflict with the needs and/or lives of endangered or threatened species or habitat.
An example is the conflict between the desires and needs of the human animals of the lumber industry and local community supported by that industry and the spotted owl. The existence of the rare and irreplaceable old growth forest, whose trees are a coveted commodity to the lumber industy, are pivotal to the old growth ecosystem. This ecosystem is a basic requirement for the existence of the endangered spotted owl This is a situation involving multiple rare and endangered species, as well as a unique and irreplaceable and unreproducable ecosystem whose existence is jeopardized by the conflicting desires of humankind.
Value incrementalism could potentially provide a logical solution to the use and testing of sonar by the U. S. Navy in sovereign and open waters relative to its negative and often fatal impact upon highly sentient sea dwelling mammals – whales, dolphins, and porpoises. There is also the possibility that there are other animals and ecosystems upon which experimental sonar testing is having a negative impact that scientists, the Navy or the public are presently unaware of.
Applying the framework of value incrementalism to these types of conflict-use issues would allow us to determine the overall moral significance of the needs of the parties in question and their broader relational properties in a context which includes the needs of other species whose needs are interdependent with the species in question and their immediate and globally shared environment.
An example is the conflict between the desires and needs of the human animals of the lumber industry and local community supported by that industry and the spotted owl. The existence of the rare and irreplaceable old growth forest, whose trees are a coveted commodity to the lumber industy, are pivotal to the old growth ecosystem. This ecosystem is a basic requirement for the existence of the endangered spotted owl This is a situation involving multiple rare and endangered species, as well as a unique and irreplaceable and unreproducable ecosystem whose existence is jeopardized by the conflicting desires of humankind.
Value incrementalism could potentially provide a logical solution to the use and testing of sonar by the U. S. Navy in sovereign and open waters relative to its negative and often fatal impact upon highly sentient sea dwelling mammals – whales, dolphins, and porpoises. There is also the possibility that there are other animals and ecosystems upon which experimental sonar testing is having a negative impact that scientists, the Navy or the public are presently unaware of.
Applying the framework of value incrementalism to these types of conflict-use issues would allow us to determine the overall moral significance of the needs of the parties in question and their broader relational properties in a context which includes the needs of other species whose needs are interdependent with the species in question and their immediate and globally shared environment.
The Origin Of Morality
Matt Silliman’s expansion of “value incrementalism” in class today answered some of the questions I had blogged earlier. I think he and DKJ have presented a thoughtful and viable theory on the origin of morality.
I totally concur with their consideration of the organic, transformative, evolutionary pattern of natural phenomena in a continuum of form capable of moral expression. I agree that in order to be morally active, sentient beings must have the capacity to be empathic, social, and experience nurturing - either through observation or direct interaction. I believe I understand the principle Matt and DKJ are employing to assign greater value to a human being over a nonhuman being in extreme situations, when both are located on the same level of equal moral value.
What I see as a natural, logical progression of the theory of value incrementalism would be to automatically assign a value of 100 to every baby when they are born. Once they become adults, their actions will determine whether they maintain that value or they will lose value in moral status. Since imperfection is natural, only adult human beings who, of their own volition, actively take actions that unjustly and unnecessarily harm innocent moral agents or patients will be devalued. Each action will be assigned a number value according to its degree of heinousness. Then, should a situation arise when a choice needs to be made between a human being of reprehensible actions and a harmless sentient being, the harmless being should be favored.
This, of course, opens up the proverbial moral can of worms, or can of moral worms – depending upon what level of active valuing we have arrived at as a society.
I believe I would find it comforting if all sentient beings were assigned a basic numerical value according to a natural, evolutionarily driven continuum, which could be increased according to their needs, their specie’s need, the needs of human society or the environment’s needs. This scale employed alongside the human action-driven scale could go a long way towards balancing prior inequities and perhaps achieving a certain level of inter and intra-species harmony.
I totally concur with their consideration of the organic, transformative, evolutionary pattern of natural phenomena in a continuum of form capable of moral expression. I agree that in order to be morally active, sentient beings must have the capacity to be empathic, social, and experience nurturing - either through observation or direct interaction. I believe I understand the principle Matt and DKJ are employing to assign greater value to a human being over a nonhuman being in extreme situations, when both are located on the same level of equal moral value.
What I see as a natural, logical progression of the theory of value incrementalism would be to automatically assign a value of 100 to every baby when they are born. Once they become adults, their actions will determine whether they maintain that value or they will lose value in moral status. Since imperfection is natural, only adult human beings who, of their own volition, actively take actions that unjustly and unnecessarily harm innocent moral agents or patients will be devalued. Each action will be assigned a number value according to its degree of heinousness. Then, should a situation arise when a choice needs to be made between a human being of reprehensible actions and a harmless sentient being, the harmless being should be favored.
This, of course, opens up the proverbial moral can of worms, or can of moral worms – depending upon what level of active valuing we have arrived at as a society.
I believe I would find it comforting if all sentient beings were assigned a basic numerical value according to a natural, evolutionarily driven continuum, which could be increased according to their needs, their specie’s need, the needs of human society or the environment’s needs. This scale employed alongside the human action-driven scale could go a long way towards balancing prior inequities and perhaps achieving a certain level of inter and intra-species harmony.
Sunday, December 7, 2008
Applying Value Incrementalism to Today's Society
In "Value Incrementalism, Perfectionism, and Sentient Nonhumans" the authors, Matt Silliman and Dave Johnson stressed the importance of empathy, morality, moral valuers, social relations and nurturance in relationship to individuals and groups. Matt made the statement, “to build a normative moral theory you will need to bridge the is-ought gap.” Dave’s response asks us to “Consider the process of becoming reflectively conscious… for such beings as ourselves (at least), socially significant facts are already evaluative, and moral values are facts of the life we are born into.”
We are individually born into a society. Today, there is grave concern about the number of people in our society who exhibit the constellation of symptoms of antisocial personality disorder. This term is often used interchangeably with "sociopathic" and "psychopathic" personality disorder. The disorder is characterized by preoccupation with one's own concerns and insensitivity to the needs of others, lack of empathy, lack of conscience, and absence of guilt or feelings of remorse even after harming other people.
Hervey Cleckley's basic criteria of the psychopathic personality are:
1. Superficial charm and good intelligence
2. Shallow emotions and lack of empathy, guilt, or remorse
3. Behaviors indicative of little life plan or order
4. Failure to learn from experience and absence of anxiety
5. Unreliability, insincerity, and untruthfulness
The disorder is considered to be influenced by both genetics and the environment. Currently, the medical community is especially concerned about the influence of our social environment on today’s youth relative to the disorder.
It seems to me that the constellation of sociopathic symptoms can easily be applied to many national and international mega businesses and political systems. Cleckley's basic criteria of the psychopathic personality accurately describes most corporate and political entities as well as the people running them.
Given the significant rise in sociopaths in today’s society, should we consider the process of humankind becoming reflectively unconscious? In what context can we place sociopaths, evaluative, socially significant facts, and the current moral values as facts of the life into which we are born?
Can value incrementalism be applied to today’s societies? Could it be useful in diagnosing current destructive societal patterns? Are we creating a self-perpetuating disorder and deconstruction of society and self? Could the process of societies becoming reflectively unconscious and amoral be the next natural step in Peirce’s principle of self-perpetuating order? Will this facilitate the rise of nonhuman sentient, empathic beings into active volition following a natural ontogeny of value?
Are we approaching a threshold where categories of moral status as agents and valuers will include empathic sentient beings according to a construction by social empathic, beings? Will this new construction dis-include all unempathic sentient beings - including human beings from level 4 on the crude scale of natural objects?
We are individually born into a society. Today, there is grave concern about the number of people in our society who exhibit the constellation of symptoms of antisocial personality disorder. This term is often used interchangeably with "sociopathic" and "psychopathic" personality disorder. The disorder is characterized by preoccupation with one's own concerns and insensitivity to the needs of others, lack of empathy, lack of conscience, and absence of guilt or feelings of remorse even after harming other people.
Hervey Cleckley's basic criteria of the psychopathic personality are:
1. Superficial charm and good intelligence
2. Shallow emotions and lack of empathy, guilt, or remorse
3. Behaviors indicative of little life plan or order
4. Failure to learn from experience and absence of anxiety
5. Unreliability, insincerity, and untruthfulness
The disorder is considered to be influenced by both genetics and the environment. Currently, the medical community is especially concerned about the influence of our social environment on today’s youth relative to the disorder.
It seems to me that the constellation of sociopathic symptoms can easily be applied to many national and international mega businesses and political systems. Cleckley's basic criteria of the psychopathic personality accurately describes most corporate and political entities as well as the people running them.
Given the significant rise in sociopaths in today’s society, should we consider the process of humankind becoming reflectively unconscious? In what context can we place sociopaths, evaluative, socially significant facts, and the current moral values as facts of the life into which we are born?
Can value incrementalism be applied to today’s societies? Could it be useful in diagnosing current destructive societal patterns? Are we creating a self-perpetuating disorder and deconstruction of society and self? Could the process of societies becoming reflectively unconscious and amoral be the next natural step in Peirce’s principle of self-perpetuating order? Will this facilitate the rise of nonhuman sentient, empathic beings into active volition following a natural ontogeny of value?
Are we approaching a threshold where categories of moral status as agents and valuers will include empathic sentient beings according to a construction by social empathic, beings? Will this new construction dis-include all unempathic sentient beings - including human beings from level 4 on the crude scale of natural objects?
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