Book Review: Rorty’s Politics of Redescription

For those interested in a more coherent presentation:

Dr. Gideon Calder, Director of the Newport Social Ethics Research Group, wrote Rorty’s Politics of Redescription. Dr. Calder’s principal interests are in ethics, political philosophy and social theory. The University of Wales Press published his book on August 15, 2007.

Richard McKay Rorty (1931–2007) was a notorious American philosopher who claimed that Philosophy (in the Western Philosophical tradition) was no longer viable. Rorty said, “Philosophy does not reveal or reflect or show or prove; it simply redescribes the terms of some given debate in order to fulfill some contingent purpose. It can best be seen as the reinterpretation of our predecessors’ reinterpretation of their predecessors’ reinterpretation.” Rorty is best known for his proposition of redescription as a substitute for Philosophy, where Philosophy with a capital P, signifies the pursuit of the True-necessary-nature of reality or knowledge or human being (p.28). According to Calder, “redescription is a post-metaphysical process; it involves no claims about the ultimate nature of reality or of human nature; it works through the persuasive force of constructed narratives” (viii). Calder declares Rorty’s concepts are “the most sustained, inventive, and resourceful among contemporary attempts to expose the contingency of Philosophical concerns” (Ibid). He argues “the rejection of philosophy as a viable tool of social change is itself a political move, and one that is far from neutral in terms of its impact on the possibility of the sort of progressive social change which Rorty himself would advocate” (p.5). His goal for this work was “to take Rorty seriously as social, political, and moral philosopher” (vii) and “to investigate what is distinctive in Rorty’s approach to politics and philosophy and the relationship between them.” (p.182) The book’s title reflects Calder’s thoughts.

Calder supplied sufficient background for a novice, like myself, to have some success following Rorty’s thinking. He described “vertical planes as those that posit some relation between an idea or a piece of language and an entity assumed to exist on a different ontological level: God, or ‘the-way-the-world really is’. Vertical thinking presumes that there are shallower and deeper levels of whatever is under investigation: the self, culture, economics structures; and it assumes access to deeper levels will help us explain the way such phenomena appear to the naked eye.” He stated, “Horizontal claims make no such reference with different ontological level; they refer only to other, preceding ideas or sentences. With a suitably ‘horizontalized’ conception of things, we will realize that there is no descriptive access, and no practical use in seeking to refer to a separate ontological level from that bequeathed to us by the horizons of previous descriptions and redescriptions.”

Calder’s book is peppered with direct quotes from Rorty, from philosophers on whom Rorty’s work was based, and from those who disagreed with Rorty; including the major themes, thoughts, and quotes found within “The Anti-Theorist’s Paradox: Dialogue with a Rortian”(Silliman and Johnson.

Calder treats Rorty’s work as broadly continuous from 1960 to 2007. He mapped his thesis out in 4 chapters; each chapter is a response to a series of questions. Calder divided his work into four chapters, with each chapter as a response to a series of questions. Chapter 1. Rorty’s Project: Redescribing Pragmatism – “Why does Rorty see the Western tradition in philosophy as something to be ‘overcome’ or ‘circumvented’ rather than persevered with?” Chapter 2. Redescription, Truth and Progress – “What is redescription, and how for Rorty does this operate as a replacement for ‘vertical’ philosophizing of the kind he would rather we left behind?” Chapter 3. Liberal Ironism – “How does Rorty seek to develop ‘liberal iron-ism’ as an anti-foundationalist alternative to the liberalism he regards as the most precious legacy of the modern philosophical tradition?” Chapter 4. Applications: History and Moral Practice – “How might we apply the core themes of Rorty’s thinking in areas where he himself does not necessarily take it - but which nonetheless shed light on its strengths and weaknesses?” (p.7).

“Redescription is a matter of imaginatively making new descriptions ‘hang together’ with existing ones. Whereas ‘metaphysicians’ ask whether some new description really has captured the nature of our subject matter, pragmatists prefer to ask whether new descriptions can be ‘woven together with previous vocabularies in a helpful way’.” (Rorty) For Calder, redescription conceived in these terms, captures Rorty’s metaphor contrasting vertical and horizontal inquiry, which Calder views as the definitive theme of Rorty’s work.

In Chapter 1 Calder establishes the overall framework of Rorty’s work in “terms of two salient binding themes”. The ‘deconstructive’ theme is where he examines Rorty’s “critique and rejection of the stakes of the metaphysical tradition, provides the basis for an appeal to pragmatism and to ethnocentrism as strategies by which we might neutralize that traditions core concerns” (Ibid). The second theme investigates Rorty’s ‘constructive’ development of a “pragmatism, which switches its central concept of ‘coping’ from an ideas-based or experience-base notion to a linguistic one”(Ibid). Calder examines Rorty’s rejection of the traditional role of the relationship between subject and object, and how this leads him to an alternative view of the relationship between human objectives and the world”. In this venue, he “considers the conceptions of truth and objectivity which Rorty presents as alternatives to their traditional variants.” Calder reflects on the charges of ‘linguistic idealism’ laid against Rorty, and considers the “implicit social conservatism in his denial of the scope for appeals either to reality or to transcendent criteria in the critique of existing ideas, norms, or practices”(p.8).

In Chapter 2, Calder finds Rorty’s account of self-creation (the “combination of a ‘non-reductive physicalist’s account of the self with the Nietzsche valorization of the importance of describing one's life on one's own terms, according to one's own dictates) as the least persuasive aspect of Rorty’s thinking. He perceives this particular construct as a deflationary, Darwinian, naturalistic view of the self at odds with his romantic emphasis on the importance of forging of a truly individual existence”. Calder argues that Rorty failed to provide an adequate or convincing narration of the relationship between agency, language, and reality.

In Chapter 3, Calder presented a comparison of Rorty’s critique of universalism with those of post-structuralist thinkers, particularly focusing attention on the work of John Rawls and Jean-Francois Lyotard. He found that both of these philosophers were closer to classical liberalism than Rorty had been presenting them.

Calder examined Rorty’s Harvard Lectures of 1997 and found it odds with his previous works. Calder describes Rorty’s “emphasis on an ontological centrality narrative and redescription itself offers a reinforcement of the shibboleths of cultural studies.”

In Chapter 4, Calder reports that Rorty presents a “rather ‘thin’ view of history, reduced to the contours of an eternal present, always redescribable according to whichever concerns are currently dominant.” In Calder’s words, the ‘thickening’ of description proceeds to the ‘thinning out’ of historicity.” Calder found Rorty's work both profoundly suggestive but quite limited. He posited that Rorty’s thesis would benefit significantly from a phenomenological analysis employing Merleau-Ponty’s understandings of bodily agency.

Calder describes Rorty as primarily, a pragmatist, but also says that he can be fairly described as a kind of ‘liberal postmodernist’. He critiqued the foundational assumptions behind Rorty's premises and the political conclusions Rorty drew from his redescriptive philosophical pragmatism.

I thought Calder did a very thorough job of presenting the various philosophical branches that Rorty argued against and used to support his own theories. I found it to be a well-written text. Calder’s thoughts were clearly presented and the format he employed made it easy to follow his and Rorty’s positions. There were so many concepts of great depth, it cannot be said that they were presented in an exhaustive manner, but Calder, I think, provided sufficient details and references to make his points. Additionally, I actually enjoyed the book, the discourse was interesting and stimulating.

Calder’s goal was to do justice to the importance and distinctiveness of Rorty’s works, highlighting its contributions and limitations. In my opinion he succeeded.

Response to Jaime: Does Lack of a Universal Definition Allow Art to be Subjective?

I believe some forms of art must exist that would be universally (for beings possessing the necessary biophysiology to experience the artistic medium) recognized as art (musical expressions spring to mind). I also think some visual art forms possess the capacity to trigger within us an internal recognition of their intrinsically artistic nature, and that this also occurs universally (same caveat).

Definitions of art often tend toward the subjective, but art is not necessarily subjective or objective. Objects subjectively defined as art, particularly when money or fame is the primary motivator for their creation, will often be considered art by some, but not others; others are created from a construct radically beyond the accepted concept of a societal norm (see Ed’s link to Natalie Jeremijenko: Tree Logic in his Art and Aesthetics blog entry).

Artistic expression can manifest in objective form, while resonating with certain bio-physiological elements of our being, which we interpret artistically.
Question: Do you think art can be created and understood objectively?

Art - Where Did It Come From? Where Is It Taking Us?

In "But They Don't Have Our Concept Of Art," Denis Dutton raises the issues of appropriation, colonialism, anthropological ethnocentrism, and aesthetic ethnocentrism.

I chose to respond to the question raised by DKJ in Q & A #10 through the issues raised by Dutton. I developed my philosophic inquiry from a bio-evolutionary, ecological viewpoint rather than an aesthetic or an anthropological perspective.

Individual and societal concepts of art are ecological reflections of the diverse historic, cultural, and environmental origins of the concept-holders. Given the great biodiversity of the planet’s natural communities, divergence in the composition of concepts between individual and group inhabitants would occur naturally along a continuum. Along this continuum, the nature and degree of conceptual divergence would reflect the degree of difference-intensity between the inhabitants’ respective natural communities. This intensity is remarkably related to each society’s original concept-producers and the ecologically-driven processes necessary for the fulfillment of their life-cycle requirements within their respective natural communities.

The life-cycle requirements of tribal individuals and communities of the Saharan Desert, Tibet, and the Amazon Jungle would necessarily be met through radically different means. This is true, as well, for the individuals and communities of Hong Kong, Montreal, and Los Angeles.

Adoption and modification of others’ goods and practices are normal elements in the evolutionary process; these traits are characteristically found among intelligent species.

I believe the appropriation of others’ goods is an instinctual element of the evolutionary process common to all species morphologically capable of such actions. Appropriative behavior originates from ancient survival mechanisms. Such primitive appropriative behavior is not dependent on cognitive intelligence.

Appropriative and cognitive behaviors can, and do, co-occur. Appropriative behaviors classically manifest as part of the developmental process in faunal species. Juvenile members of intelligent, sentient species may mature beyond appropriative behaviors if such behaviors are not necessary to the life-cycle success of the organism, and the organism has the necessary levels of mental and psychological health to function as a healthy member of their society.

Organisms displaying entitled, uncompassionate, or non-empathetic orientations would be considered lacking sufficient necessary, mental or psychological health to be viewed as viable members of their society. These traits have become more common in large, technologically orientated, consumptive-driven, Western-style modern societies.

Choosing not to appropriate an other’s goods is a reflection of an individual’s morality. Morality has resource relational and opportunity-dependent requirements, which are necessary for its creation and maintenance. A sufficient amount of necessary familial, societal, educational, genetic, and environmental resources in appropriate, but not necessarily specific, combinations can facilitate the moral development of individual persons.

Intelligence is a necessary, but not necessarily sufficient requirement for moral behavior. Intelligent cogitation and morality should be the foundation of our conceptions of art, and our willingness to accept, to reject, or refuse to inappropriately judge others' concepts of art and artifacts.

The volumes of passionate discourse produced in arguments attempting to define art, and the inflamed proselytizing of a preferred concept by certain individuals and factions within some cultural, artistic, and philosophical societies, is what I find significant about competing theories of the nature of art.

Environmental biodiversity and bioproductivity in combination with cultural and cognitive perceptions could serve as cardinal influences in the development and composition of human-created concepts and artifacts. If that were the case, then environmental, biological, cognitive, and moral evolutionary processes could prompt re-conceptualizations of humankind's constructs.

Art, one of the constructs that human beings are the most passionate about, has the potential to perform as a pivotal axis around which humankind might progress to its next evolutionary rung.

Perhaps we might apply techniques of Biomimicry to art and constructs of art, viewing and valuing art based not in the context of what we can extract from it, but instead by what we may learn from it. (http://www.biomimicry.net/)

Questions:
1. Is art an organic element of evolution, biological in origin like morality - born out of a survival instinct, or does art only exist as a construct? Is it both, more, or other?

2. Why do so many people possess that passion-driven need to produce a defining determination of what constitutes art? What do you think humankind will gain from such a determination?

On Viewing Violence

He who fights with monsters might take care,
Lest he thereby become a monster.
And if you gaze for long into an abyss,
The abyss gazes also into you.

Fredrick Nietzche

Response to Jacob's question on aesthetics, morality, pornography and erotica

Jacob's Questions:
Would an aesthetic difference between erotica and pornography change a moral view of the subject?
Would it be more likely that viewing one would be considered more moral than the other?

I think it is our personal moral views that determine whether or not we consider a work to possess an aesthetic, and that judgment would determine whether or not we viewed the work (except in individuals suffering with compulsive or aberrant disorders). For instance, I choose to limit my exposure to material that I consider either uninteresting (brain can't compute) or not helpful to my evolution as a human being. I strive for economy of energy. Therefore, I have not been exposed (since early 70s) to what is generally considered erotic or pornographic materials - including explicitly descriptive lyrics.

I consider this an evolutionary choice, some might consider it a moral choice.

Or should a class on aesthetics not even broach this subject?

Your questions remind me of the chicken or the egg dilemma. Personally, I think Philosophy class is an invigorating and appropriate venue for a discussion of morals, erotica, and pornography.

My Question:
Do you think most people's decisions are based in their morality?

Contemplating Thanksgiving

After President Obama pardoned "Courage" at his daughter's request, I wondered if the Obamas or any other Americans would be prompted by this child's compassion for that turkey to think about the relationship between a living creature and what they consume as food.

Pornography, Erotica, and Art

The dictionary defines pornography as obscene writings, drawings, photographs, or the like, esp. those having little or no artistic merit or sexually explicit pictures, writing, or other material whose primary purpose is to cause sexual arousal or the presentation or production of this material or lurid or sensational material (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pornography).

The Cultural Dictionary defines pornography as books, photographs, magazines, art, or music designed to excite sexual impulses and considered by public authorities or public opinion as in violation of accepted standards of sexual morality. And it states, American courts have not yet settled on a satisfactory definition of what constitutes pornographic material.

The Cultural Dictionary defines obscenity as behavior, appearance, or expression (such as films and books) that violate accepted standards of sexual morality. “American courts have long tried to define obscenity but without much success. Some believe, for example, that any depiction of nudity is obscene; others would argue that nudity in itself is not obscene.”

The Encyclopedia Britannica Online defines erotica as literary or artistic works having an erotic theme; especially, books treating of sexual love in a sensuous or voluptuous manner. The word erotica typically applies to works in which the sexual element is regarded as part of the larger aesthetic aspect. It is usually distinguished from pornography, which can also have literary merit but which is usually understood to have sexual arousal as its main purpose (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/erotica).

Matthew Kiernan provides the following definition of pornography: The primary goal is the elicitation of sexual arousal (p. 372), it is the sexually explicit, formulaic, and fantasy elements that constitute the pornographic (p. 375), and the standard view of pornography construes it as soliciting a certain kind of objectifying interest in those represented (p. 376). He declares, “We evaluate art works by applying a cluster of general criteria that concern the quality of the imaginative experience afforded (p. 375). He believes “pornographic works can make imaginative use of non-standard and standard formulaic elements in order to be artistically expressive and thereby afford a qualitatively high imaginative experience. Pornographic purpose does not preclude meaningful artistic aims.” (p. 376).

In Kiernan’s Footnote (#2, p. 379), he states, “Levinson characterizes pornography as essentially degrading to women, in terms of violence, domination or humiliation, whereas he does not see the erotic as thus characterized. This is either too narrow a characterization of pornography or it stretches the sense of terms like violence beyond meaningful limits.”

Jerrold Levinson claims that pornographic art is an oxymoron, that it is impossible for anything to be both pornographic and art.

The fact that the American judicial system has been unable, during its long history, to define pornography or obscenity illustrates the definitional nature of the problems associated with attempted categorizations of art and pornography.

Like art, or any artifact produced by humankind, its production and its reception are experienced in a sociocultural paradigm. Sociocultural influences of morality, ethics, and normative values are the determinant factors in the categorization of objects as pornographic, erotic, or works of art.

MY QUESTIONS:

Should works that are produced using or depicting moral patients in ways that are harmful to them be illegal?

Do we need to create a separate category for these types of works?

Are Trading Games Works of Art? A Response to Ed's Question

Though Ed's questions originated from a topic on which I am nearly absolutely ignorant, I found they led down an intriguing path.

Question 1.
Would these pieces, commissioned specifically to appear on a trading card, be considered works of art?

I think we would all agree from studies in this class and the Philosophy of Art course that some of the greatest works of art are commissioned pieces. So we cannot exclude the illustrations on Magic Cards as art because they are commissioned.

Question 2.
Would the cards on which the artwork appears be considered works of art, themselves?

I can relate this to previous chapters on art forgeries and reproductions. It is my belief that this is more a question of morality than one of art. In the case of Magic: the Gathering, the illustrations were created intentionally and specifically for reproduction as an artistic component of the game. I think the caliber of the illustrations themselves, as they appear as reproductions, should be the determinant factor as to whether or not the cards can be considered as containing works of art. I question whether one could consider the entire card as a work of art because then one is also evaluating whatever is written on the illustrated card. I am too ignorant of the game and these cards to respond strongly. If they are all similar to the card appearing on Tania’s blog, then I think the instructions appearing under the illustration might disqualify the individual cards themselves from consideration as individual works of art. I did find the quotation in this card quite clever, the reference to Borborygmus (stomach noises – growling or rumbling) with food and the boarish resemblance of the character on that card reflect the scope of knowledge of this game’s creator. I see no reason not to consider the artwork on these cards as similar to morally produced prints or reproductions of legitimate works of art – which leads to Ed’s last question.

Or the trading card game taken as a whole (be considered as works of art)?

If we take the trading card game as a whole to be a work of art, then we are necessarily including the instructions and the quotations, as well as the story and the illustrations.
Again, my ignorance of these games leaves me at a disadvantage. If the story were unalterable, as it is in literary works (which may be reprinted with new illustrations or photographs, but the literary text of the work is unchanged), then we would have to evaluate the game as a whole by assessing the artistic qualities of its parts. If the story qualifies as a literary work of art; and if the quotations and the illustrations deepen that story and are of the caliber necessary for consideration as works of art, then one still must determine whether or not the instructions are intrinsically considered as an aspect of the story AND as a result of this consideration OR on their separate merit, meet the requirements necessary to qualify as a work of art before one might consider evaluating the game as a work of art.

If the storyline itself were altered by individual players, then we would necessarily need to evaluate each new story (game) and judge the caliber of each new story (only if we had already granted work of art status to the original story and its instructions, quotes, and illustrations) in order to consider it as a work of art.

Given all this, I think we either have to conclude that these games as a whole, while comprised of artistic elements, which separately might be considered as works of art, are not works of art (as now classified and accepted), or we need to provide an additional category for works of art that allows us to evaluate, classify, and categorize them as works of art.

My Question
Are the categories or classifications of "works of art" as they currently exist, sufficient or insufficient? Do they invite or discourage art?

Response to Aristotle, Benefits of Exposure to, and Overconsumption of, Certain Fiction and Non-fiction

A certain theme developed from reading the latest blogs.

I agree with Aristotle that being constantly weighed down by certain feelings may cause impediments in the quality of execution and experience of one’s daily life. I do not think that it necessarily follows that being cleansed of pity or fear leads one to become a more courageous being – though this could be a semantical issue. There are at least sometimes when even emotions putatively considered as negative, are nevertheless the appropriate response to the particular experience.

I believe we can we equally benefit from exposure to certain fictions and non-fiction, especially those exposures undertaken mindfully.

I think exposure to fictional situations offers opportunities for us to step outside of, or suspend temporarily, the thoughts and feelings that we have not yet sufficiently organized, absorbed, and holistically integrated into our evolutionary progression as a human being. The pause fiction provides can be utilized by us in various manners. We may choose to immerse ourselves in fiction to create a respite from an intense, unresolved reality; a tool used intentionally to suspend reality - as others may do through the sufficient consumption of alcohol or other mind-altering substances.

Participating in fictional experiences may allow us to shed at least some of the intensity of our (unproductive) emotions, at least temporarily. Additionally, fiction can potentially provide us with opportunities to mentally review the causational relationship between our thoughts and our emotions; and possibly extract some understanding through this process that alters the degree, or nature, of the emotion that was hampering us (from executing our life to its fullest potential).

I believe what Jamie is referring to in his blog is the unhealthy over-consumption of specific genres of non-fiction by some members of certain cultures. It appears that some Americans are obsessively substituting engagement in fictional realms in lieu of appropriately participating in, and relationally engaging with, their natural, physical world.

Fiction and non-fiction appropriately managed, may offer us situations and experiences that would otherwise be impossible for us to encounter, thereby increasing our opportunities for understanding, health, and evolution.

My Questions:
1. Do you think that some, many, or most, of the individuals who utilize Role-Playing Games do so in a healthy or obsessive manner?
2. Do you think individuals use RPGs and LARPs for the same reason others use fiction?

Horror and Fiction

Even before reading Berys Gaut’s The Paradox of Horror, I disagreed with Carroll’s claim that the appeal of horrific art can be reduced to the positive feelings associated with "fascination" or "curiosity”.

Carroll claims that horror fiction is a special variation on general narrative motivation because its central features, i.e., the character, nature, origin, and weaknesses of monsters are unknowable, and as such, exist outside of our conceptual schema (p. 303). However, these exact conditions exist in fantasy and science fiction, nullifying his claim that horror fiction is a special variation on the general narrative motivation. His attempts to rationalize his theory by claiming the difference between being curious about the unknown but natural, versus curiosity of the unknown and impossible (p. 307) in which horror fictions typically traffic are also typical of science fiction and fantasy. His theory also fails to address the genre of art-horror that depicts humankind or other natural beings (sharks, dogs, octopuses, gorillas) behaving in abnormal ways.

Carroll goes on to suggest that the processes of revelation and disclosure of monsters and their properties as unknown and unknowable, is what “captures our interest and delivers pleasure”; while their inherent monstrosity simultaneously disgusts and horrifies us, thereby creating a “paradox of horror.” Carroll asserts that the disgust and horror we feel is “part of the price to be paid for the pleasure of their disclosure.” He further claims that this resolves “the paradox of horror” (304-305). He further states that “experiencing the emotion of art-horror is not our absolutely primary aim in consuming horror fictions…rather (it) is the price we are willing to pay for the revelation…of that which violates our conceptual schema…because disgust is required for the pleasure involved in engaging our curiosity in the unknown…in the processes of revelation, ratiocination, etc” (306). His above claims are false. I, and many others, routinely experience the pleasure of engaging curiously in the unknown, using processes of logical proofs, hypotheses, arguments, explanations, and revelations without experiencing disgust (philosophy courses for example). In fact, I have never had a single college course where my curiosity was not piqued on more than one occasion from exposure to the unknown (and prior to the revelation of its potential existence) was unknowable to me. Could we not accurately say that all things, to which we have not yet been exposed to, contextually or conceptually, are unknowable to us? And is it not possible, that when first exposed to the novel we can be both fascinated and curious, and experience most novelties without disgust? Everything for which we have not yet developed a referential lexicon is unknowable to us; however, disgust is neither necessary nor required to facilitate processes of curiosity, revelation, or knowing.

I agree with Gaut, there is no paradox of horror (p. 328) and “that the concepts of all emotions implicitly incorporate references to desires which are typically possessed by those experiencing the emotion” (p. 329). We evaluate emotions as possessing negative or positive qualities on a scale according to our mental rationalizations, and that all emotions are a secondary response to a thought. Our thoughts create our emotions. Or as Gaut states, “the full solution to the paradoxes depends both on a view of the emotions as evaluative, and on the recognition of how mental holism presents itself in respect of emotions, desires, and enjoyment.

My Questions:

1. Do you agree that there is a conceptual connection between evaluation and pleasure?
2. If something is pleasurable, natural (biological or physiological origins),and a
societal norm, yet it is either unattainable or absent from your life, is its absence
necessarily painful?

Moved by Fiction

I believe the best explanation for our capacity to be moved by fiction is a Darwinian one. Walton provided a brief reference to this in Footnote 15 (p. 271). It has been well documented that young (and often mature) mammals play using objects or living creatures within their environment in representational acts. They manipulate themselves and others within their environment in ways that appear to simulate future potential experiences. The response to the imagined prey or predator is characteristically similar in nature to what their normal response would be if the situation were real. Engaging in fiction allows mobile and/or social beings the opportunity to practice and hone critical life skills in a safe environment, where errors of timing, nature of response, perception, and choice, are not fatal. The capacity to empathize with others is necessary for the formation and maintenance of healthy relationships between intelligent, sentient, social beings. From an evolutionary perspective, social skills are survival skills. Empathizing with fictional characters is a normal emotional and physiological response for intelligent, sentient, social beings.

Physiologically, we absorb virtual images from visual mediums. We construct virtual images from descriptive verbal and written communications. The more elaborate our constructions, or the sensory intensity and completeness of virtual mediums, the more intensely we experience and respond to them as if they were real in the physical sense. In this way, like other young mammals, we are playing within a range of “possible” albeit improbable encounters of objects or others within our environment. This fictional play can be preparatory in nature, an exercise in imagination, a safe opportunity to express emotion, or simply the enjoyment intelligent creatures find in playful activities.

The neurochemical pathways in the brain are the same for an image experienced in reality or one seen, or inferred from, within a virtual 3-D world. The virtual world is alive and real in some of the pathways of our minds. Our emotional and psychological responses parallel those that we would experience if the virtual images and inferences were a physical component of our existence. Our mind blurs the boundaries between the physical images perceived and the virtual images constructed in response to that which we are/have experienced. The greater the degree of submersion in the virtual imagery and our inferences, the more intensely our mind and body will respond to the experience as if it were physical.

My Questions:

1. Does your body suffer from exposure to traumatic fiction?

2. Does your body suffer from exposure to traumatic non-fiction?

3. What is gained from exposure to virtual fictional wanton violence?

4. What is lost from exposure to virtual fictional wanton violence?

5. Do the gains from exposure to virtual traumatic non-fiction outweigh the losses from
that exposure?

Scruton and the Art of Photography

Scruton convincingly shows that the art of photography is best served when judged by different standards than those applied to the art of painting and his definition of the ideal photograph. He stated, “it is not necessary to define the subject of a photograph in terms of this causal process…the subject is so defined for my logical ideal of photography: that premise is all my argument requires” (p 222.). He claims that the intentional act involved in the ideal photograph is not an essential part of the photographic relation. According to Scruton, the ideal photograph yields an appearance, but it is only interesting as a record of how an actual object looked, not as the realization of an intention (p. 214.). While this might be true of some types of photography some of the time, I do not believe it to be true for all types of photography, and certainly not all of the time.

I can compare photographers of nature, people, and landscapes, to artists, who painted scenes of village, country, aristocratic, military, or monastic life, utilizing existing landscapes, buildings, and accoutrements to capture the essence of the times and their intent.

Scruton’s argument that a photograph lacks “intentional existence” and is incapable of representing anything unreal excises the imagination and vision of the photographer and the observer from the artistic process. We might “see” dragons, unicorns, gnomes, or trolls in patterns of cloud formations, tree bark, boulders, sand, or landscapes, and choose to photograph, and even share these visions with others. Our sense of what the photographer intended might determine our experience of what is there, in the same manner a painter’s intentions might determine our experience of the subject of the painting (p 215).

I do not believe that a painting is necessarily a complete expression of the thought it contains. If that were true, then we would not need art reviews, art critics, or art experts, and we would not have discussions about incomprehensible art.

Portraiture photographs of people, and other sentient non-human animals, which capture the subject’s eyes looking directly at the photographer, can be compelling and revealing in a time-less mode. The ability of a photograph to capture the essence of a person is the reason many aboriginal people believed that photographs stole the soul of the person photographed. Scruton did not address the powerful stories told by this style of photography.

Our reading thus far this semester has illustrated the fact that knowledge does inform our aesthetic appreciation of art. When observing a photograph of children interacting, knowledge of children adds to our depth of understanding of the relational experience of the children, and possibly even insight into the nature of the soul of the children; who they were then, and what nature of adults they will most like become. Knowledge of the subject, whether that subject is animate or inanimate informs our relationship with its representation, whether painted or photographed. While viewing a photograph of the Grand Canyon, we can appreciate the processes of erosion that sculpted it, the edaphic qualities that provide its coloration, and the enormity of its scale. Knowledge of the subject can complete the expression of the thought within an image, and provide it with that sense of permanence Scruton believes is a requirement of true representational thought. These are some of the reasons I believe Scruton failed to convincingly show photography to be lesser art form than painting.

My Questions:

1. Does digitally optimizing a picture (according to the sense of the individual photographer) alter its basic nature - making it more or less of an artistic object?

2. Can photographs "capture the soul" of the sentient-being photographed?

Edit of "Can we have immoral art; and how might we characterize it?"

I apologize for the errors in editing my questions and the hiccup in my train of thought.

Question 4 should be: Once created, does a work of performance art have its own existence, separate from its performers?

Question 5. Once created, does a work of art have its own existence separate from observers?

Can we have immoral art; and how might we characterize it?

I believe there are three theoretical categories of immoral art and that real works of art can be found in all three theoretical categories.

I would characterize the first category as art produced by an immoral person, where the judgment of immorality is based upon the artist’s character and is not necessarily related to the actual production of said art. In such a case, a value judgment of immorality levied against an artist would then be transferred to the object of art through the association of its creation from an immoral source. Examples of this category of immoral art would be the art produced by Adolph Hitler, Roman Polanski, Woody Allen, and Michael Jackson. (For more of Hitler's paintings go to http://quazen.com/arts/art-history/10-paintings-by-adolf-hitler/)

The second category would be characterized as art produced through immoral actions. Here, a value judgment of immorality levied against the method of artistic production would then be conveyed to the art object by virtue of its immoral fabrication. Examples of this category of immoral art would be: art produced from stolen materials or ideas; art produced involuntarily (from coercion in any form on any sentient being, i.e., slave or child labor, blackmail, all wild animal performances, inhumane domestic animal performances); art produced or performed through immoral actions such as killing a sentient being for the purpose of using their bodily fluids or other parts as a medium in an artistic creation (blood for paint, skin as canvas, bones in sculptures), utilizing paint drenched bodies in an orgy directed on canvas or sculpting medium (this has the potential to be a painting or sculpture created from an immoral act or a performance of an immoral act (category #3) or both); and art conceived, created, or performed while the artist/s are using illegal substances, i.e. heroin, cocaine, marijuana, peyote, and alcohol (when legal age-applicable). This category would also have to contain art conceived, created, or performed in a drunken (or other legally sanctioned, mind/consciousness altering substance) stupor – a morally deficient state. Here the immorality lies in the method and the means of production.

The third category would harbor any art offering for consumption representational, or actual, immoral objects and activities, including vocal and verbal communication. Art (including literary works of art and opera) depicting killing, maiming, raping, pillaging, war, crucifixions, slavery, domination, classism, prejudice, elitism, sexism, ageism, species extinction, lewd and lascivious dancing, music, or performances, acts of love-making or fornication, elimination of bodily wastes, expletives, or artistic performances involving any immoral language, gestures, sounds, or activities fall into this third category.

All three categories share one thing; we are not judging the morals of the art itself. Instead, we are judging the morals intrinsic to the art’s creators, or judging the morality of the manufacturing methods these creators employed to produce their art, or judging the morality or immorality of the ideas, objects, sounds, and actions, i.e., the content presented by the art’s creators.

Richard Westwood-Brookes, a historical documents expert at Mullock's of Shropshire auction house, on being questioned about the sale of Hitler-related artifacts said, "I don't take any moral position. You can't say this guy was a bad guy, so I won't sell his memorabilia, this guy was a good guy so I will sell his. If you do that, where do you stop?"
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/04/23/hitler.auction/index.html

Morals and art are interpreted through the different perspectives born of culture, educated by life-experience, curiosity, and reflection. Art, which is itself an object and therefore lacks agency, is morally neutral. It is only within the context of the interaction between the art and its observer can the question of morals be raised. Moreover, that context will either be informed by, or ignorant of, the personal morals of its creator and/or the morality or immorality involved in the production and presentation of said work of art. It is within the framework of that context our reflections on morality should be deliberated. That context is ripe with “eyes of the other,” opportunities for Socratic Moments, and self-and societal-enrichment.

My Questions:

1.Do moral considerations, whether they concern the artist or the artistic object itself, have any relevance to whether or not a thing qualifies as a work of art?

2.Should the moral or immoral actions of artists effect how we evaluate their art?

3.Once created, does a work of art have its own existence, separate from its creator?

4.Once created, does a work of performance art have its own existence, separate from its performers?

Classifying Art in Nature

A response to Tania's question: In regards to art, how does one classify nature, clearly nature is functional, and as far as intention one may need to first consider a divine force in order to follow the question out a bit further, but if one were than where would it fit?

Some non-human sentient beings intentionally create architectural structures, others intentionally create (or recreate) music (performed solo, in duets, or in a chorus), some perform elaborate dances, some purposefully seek out specific objects that they then intentionally arrange in a unique pattern (“found art”), some adapt human-made instruments to create visual or musical arrangements. Given these facts, we should consider these types of non-human creations from an artistic point of view.

I believe beings with certain capacities far superior to human beings exist, however, I do not think that would necessarily make them divine beings. I do believe these meta-human beings intentionally create and express themselves in what human beings would consider artistic modes.

My Questions: Why do you think most human beings are so reluctant to consider the intentional artistic expression of mammals and birds as art?

Self-consciousness and Others

I believe the understanding in class is that, thus far, we have been discussing art philosophy from the anthropocentric perspective (a perspective I find incomplete in certain ways). After reading "Personhood and the Paradoxes and Challenges of Cultural Progress" I found myself wondering why many philosophical discourses continue to omit the potentially valuable inclusion of sentient non-human others. I assume there is a logical explanation for this purposeful omission, but I believe this omission interferes with our personal exploration and understanding of our world, with attending negative consequences for society.

Yake's discussion of Hegel's insight "we are what we can become as we see ourselves reflected in the eyes of those who look on us," was prefaced with the statement that "the flow and growth of personhood via self-consciousness is primarily the consequent of human interaction..." In today's disjointed society, with its incohesive families, estranged by divorce, physical, generational, and moral distances, more human beings find solace, companionship, and community in the company of non-human beings.

I am aware of how much I have grown (and seek to continue this self- and other-consciousness) from seeing myself reflected in the eyes of other (not human) beings. I believe that self- and other-consciousness would lead to moral considerations of others, creating a system of compassionate ethics that would encompass all sentient life forms.

My Question:
Can a self- and other-consciousness ethic be implemented in art?

Response to Jaime's Question: Does art exist without humans?

I believe that some members of nonhuman species engage in artistic expression on a par with human artistry; and that some, at times, experience ecstatic states, or metaphysical awareness from their own creation, or the appreciation of an other's artistic works. I believe that some birds, elephants, cetaceans, primates, monkeys, and canines produce art (some aural, some visual, some architectural).

I enjoyed your examples of feline art - they are extremely visually orientated beings, however, your point is well taken in that we are unable to determine (human limitation) what their intentions are for producing this art.

My Question:

Do you think art is necessarily metaphysical, meta-hedonistic, and should produce distinguishable evolution through insight, epiphany, increased understanding or awareness of self, others, or one's world to be considered as art?

Scruton's Claim of the Superiority of Instrumental Music

Scruton's claim is based on his belief that music has been designed as an inherently moral and religious tool for the evolution of humankind as individuals into morally and aesthetically superior societies. He uses the musical forms of historic Western/European societies as the standard against which he judges current musical forms. He chose traditional formation dance as the instrument to illustrate his claims of a properly ordered (and sexually obsessed) community, and that modern dance represents a decline in morals as well as music (p. 119).

I disagree with Scruton’s claims for a number of reasons. First, he is applying an historical culture-specific standard to the tapestry of a globalized, modern, culturally integrated (or at least, exposed) expression of music and dance. His references are temporally and spatially inappropriate for such modern globalized societies. Second, formation dance is well practiced in country music, contra-dance, polkas, Celtic and other traditions. Third, his claims ignore the universal biological element of music’s affect on sentient organisms.

Music is an undeniable force of life; sentient beings are compelled to respond to it. The degrees of response experienced by a species and by an individual exist on a continuum. I agree with Plato, Aristotle, and Scruton's assessment that music has potential for offering a character forming nature for us; some of its affect - the biological and emotional responses it elicits from its audience can be aspirational.

The majority of these responses have their origins in biology. I believe these original and primarily functions were engineered to facilitate reproduction in sentient beings (maybe this is why Scruton can't disengage dance from sexual expression?). As a species or an individual evolve, the physiological functions formerly served by music (or any inessential for life function an organism has evolved beyond) can be replaced by aesthetic, hedonistic, or spiritual patterns. Music’s primary role can shift; it can become a tool for socio-political purposes, or artistic and/or spiritual evolution of individuals or societies. I think music has always served individuals in this way, although I think the degree to which that occurs has been undervalued. Today’s society is a diverse, multicultural aggregate of class, age, and spiritual beliefs; and music is clearly a reflection of the societies that consume it.

My Questions:
1. Is globalization a greater influence on modern music than melody, harmony, tonality, or musical style?
2. What impact (if any) has globalization had on religiousness as it relates to music?

Is Philosophy an Art? A response to Ed’s response.

Definitions of philosophy [Gr.,=love of wisdom] - study of the ultimate reality, causes, and principles underlying being and thinking. It has many aspects and different manifestations according to the problems involved and the method of approach and emphasis used by the individual philosopher. < http://www.reference.com/browse/philosophy>

Philosophy is the study of general and fundamental problems concerning matters such as existence, knowledge, values, reason, mind, and language. Philosophy is distinguished from other ways of addressing these questions (such as mysticism or mythology) by its critical, generally systematic approach and its reliance on reasoned argument < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy>.

Philosophy was designed as a forum for creative communication, an intentional medium with aspirations for the expansion of awareness of individuals and societies.

Your definitions of art include "The Medium is the route through which the Emotion or Idea is expressed. Whatever it is, it is something that can be perceived by the viewer, and thus completes the communication of the art. Expression of an Idea or Emotion indicates that art is a communicative act. It exists, not for itself ... but for the viewer. It must share an Emotion or Idea. When philosophy is expressed in a medium, it then has the potential to be art, but only if there is the conscious intention of the philosopher/artist that it BE a work of art."

I believe Philosophy was created as an art form. The fact that some "philosophers" are poor artists is a reflection on them, not on the philosophical medium.

My Question:
Should we classify artistic mediums by examples of their highest representation or by the quality of execution of their creators?

Are ethics a necessary element of art?

Arthur Koestler “insists that an object’s status as original or forged is extraneous information, incidental to its intrinsic aesthetic properties” (Alex Neil and Aaron Ridley, 2008. Arguing About Art. Routledge. p. 103). After reading Alfred Lessing and Denis Dutton’s views on Fakes and Forgeries, it appears to me that originality and morality are not necessary ingredients for either the creation or appreciation of “great works of art” from an aesthetic consideration. The object d’art being considered is neither a moral agent nor a moral patient.
We know it is possible to regard highly works of art without knowledge of their origins or the purpose behind their creators’ manifestations of them. As discussed in class, the history and authorship of works of art as “authentic” may be inaccurate, either through ignorance or deliberate misrepresentation. The judgment of authenticity is relative to the author of the work not the work itself, and therefore should be considered separately from an aesthetic review of the work.

My question is:
Are ethics a necessary element of art?

Response to Barry's Question

Barry asks, " Is it not the "intent" of those who create great art to express that "silent knowledge" to those of us who do not have sufficient energy to tap into that knowledge for ourselves?"

This reminded me of a response I wrote to one of Keane's older posts. Keane asked, "Is all art derived from creative introspection and subsequent realization?" I reviewed and edited that response as follows:

I agree that how we define art and creativity is essential for a determination of relational or independent properties. I think art minimally must reflect the incorporeal spark of its creator’s nature (physiological or spiritual). I believe great art is the co-creative product of the mind/body/essence of a corporeal being and their environment, and if they are fortunate, of the essence of their environment (meaning the artist was influenced by spiritual essence of the creative physical environment). One of the beliefs that I hold is that there are incorporeal spirits aligned with, responsible for, and inhabiting, natural communities.

I do not think that it is a necessary condition that all art must be derived from creative introspection and subsequent realization. I think art can also be created instinctively or subconsciously, and with or without subsequent realization for the creator or a given observer.

To the specifics of Barry's question:
I think that sometimes it can be the "intent" of those who create great art to express that "silent knowledge" to those of us who do not have sufficient energy to tap into that knowledge for ourselves, but I think that often great art (or art in general) is manifested from an internally driven and unconscious primordial process absent intentions towards others.

My Questions:
1. What is the originator of great artists' artistry, and where does it come from?

2. Is the causal source different for cognitively-intentional art than it is for art birthed through incogitative processes?

3. Is there only a single Source for all creators of spontaneous or non-intentional art (are we all dipping our brushes into a single
reservoir from our individual and therefore unique positions)?

Response to Jacob's question: How do I define art?

I think art is, by its nature, relational. It requires a creator and an audience/ observer/s [who also may be its creator (potentially an audience of one)]. How we define art and creativity is essential for determination of relational or independent properties. What humankind considers as art are constructs. Whether they are the consequence of sociocultural, intuitive, or spiritual constructs, each person will have a unique (and therefore, subjective) relationship to art.

While art may be recognized/understood through cogitative processes with consequent realizations, those processes are not necessary for the creation, or recognition, of an object/concept as art.

Art may be produced intentionally, or from a non-cognitive source (subconscious, biological, or spiritual derivatives). A creative process is necessary to realize art, though the process may be actualized subconsciously - through a primeval directive rather than through cogitative intent.

An artistic product may have form, or, it may be immaterial (thoughts, discourse, constructs, concepts, etc.). I believe art is the co-creative product of the mind/body/essence of a corporeal being and others, or/and their environment.

Philosophy is the intellectual and creative pursuit and accumulation of wisdom; its purposeful inquiries result in novel awareness of self and surroundings. There is a form and artistry to both the philosophical process and its effects (as well as a history and merit). Therefore, I view philosophy as an art.

My Question:
Do you think other beings are producers of art? If so, how do (or do they) determine whether a creation of theirs, or another being’s, is art?

The Art of Philosophy

From today's discussion on what constitutes art, and what is considered a minor or major art, I must ask the questions: Is philosophy an art? Is there an "Art of Philosophy"? If philosophy is an art, is it a "major" or a "minor" art?

I believe philosophy is an art because it is a relational activity between persons, or between a person and their thoughts (which are created by a person's relationship (perception) with an observed or imagined object (tangible or intangible - includes thoughts), or other being; and this art form is practiced through forms of communication. When exercised properly (observer/receiver of philosophical communication experiences some cognitive response that furthers their spiritual/mental evolution), I would consider philosophy to be a "major" art. In order for philosophy to be classified as a "major" art, I would expect merit and gain for both the originator and the receiver of a philosophical discourse. Philosophy practiced without these elements would be "minor" and unworthy of the descriptor of either art or philosophy.

Questions:
1. Is philosophy an art? If you consider it an art, do you consider it a "major"or "minor" art?

2. Do all creative endeavors, including food preparation, presentation, and consumption, have the potential to be either a "major" or a "minor" art depending on the artistry of the creator and the sociocultural relativity of the observer to the object created (successfulness and quality of communication)?

2a.In other words, should a poorly executed painting of a meaningless object be classified under the category of a "major" work of art simply because it is falls under the "major" art forms category, while a sublimely prepared and artistically-presented sumptuous culinary masterpiece is held to evaluations as a "minor" art because "some" have classified it in the "minor" arts category.

Response to ETM's Question "What sections do I believe we should cover in this course?

Having just completed the P of M course last semester, I would prefer to spend more time on Appreciation, understanding and nature (I'm a big fan of "nature as art" and the artistic nature of other beings). For those same reasons and the portrait and landscape qualities of some photography, I'm very interested in Photography and representation.
I'm curious to learn about Feelings and fictions simply because it is a topic I have not previously contemplated. I abhor horror movies, I don't subject myself to them (or extreme violence or pornography) however, I am curious about what they do to us from a biological/psychological perspective - what function do they/can they serve to those who expose themselves to it, and what it is that I and others who never expose ourselves to horror as entertainment are, perhaps, missing. I am interested in Part 9 because I lack knowledge on this topic, and I'm very curious about most things which are novel to me. Wouldn't mind skipping Section 10 just because I know the topic makes me uncomfortable, but once again, novelty, curiosity of philosophical angle to topic...
Would love to debate Public Art and Are there societies without art? because these are topics I am passionate about, and about which I am eager to learn more.
I assume DKJ has read the text and would appreciate his insight on the topics, and I think your idea for an Aesthetics II has great merit.

Purpose, Utility, Intent, and Impermanency

I spent a good part of my summer pondering the impermanent nature of everything and wondering what the true purpose might be behind creating that, which by design, must decay.

I considered the possibility that it is all about evolution. But again, the fact that decay is inevitable for all things left me feeling that would be an illogical and impoverished evolutionary path - where and what is the gain when the solar system disappears?

This led me to wonder about the utility of categorizations like purpose, function, and performance in an impermanent world. What is the purpose/meaning of life? What is the function of evolution? Who/What/How was what we now classify as "life" created? Was it done intentionally and cognitively? Was impermanence assigned as an inherent characteristic of the original design? What is the logical outcome of design impermanency? What is/should be the ultimate goal of an impermanent existence for a reflective being?

Telfer's desire to classify food as a simple and minor art, partially because of food's utilitarian nature, its transiency, intensity of aesthetic reactions, aesthetic judgments, and the nature of "works of art" and "art forms" brought me back to my summer musings - but with a twist. Why do beings create? What is the purpose of the activity of creating? Does it serve an evolutionary function? Is it an aspect of a being's biological imperative? Is the act of creating inherently artistic? Is the creation of life an artistic act? Do all life forms create? Is creativity a necessity to actualize art? Must creativity necessarily be cogitative and intentional? Can art be created by the subconscious? Or accidentally? Should art be compared through interartistic disciplines?

I am extremely curious about humankind's propensity for judging and labeling, especially in the very personal and subjective realm of art. I am concerned about our society's obsession with value judgments proceeding from its materialistic, unethical, and spiritually impoverished mores and their misapplication to art.

More Questions:

Are judgments and dichotomies the result of the brain's biological need to find patterns through hierarchical imposition? Is this why society feels compelled to judge art? If it is, how does judging art inform us biologically or evolutionarily?

Reacting to Telfer's Food as Art

Telfer posits that the process of preparing, presenting, and consuming meals is too common, too necessary, too simple, too temporally, spatially, and sequentially insufficient to be considered as art. She defends these claims with references to the accepted practices of evaluation and classification to determine an artifact’s status as an art form or a work of art (p 20). She states food can be, and in some cases, is, an art, but it is only a minor art because it is not only simple, it is also limited by its impermanence, meaninglessness, and its inability to move us (p 26).

I found this particular reasoning constrictive, incomplete, and biased.

I agree with the idea offered in class by Ed, that the person experiencing the thing will be the one imposing the meaning of art upon it.

I think art is, by its nature, relational; and its relational nature has its origins in biology. All of our sensory perceptions are the result of signals transported through various organic mechanisms to the brain, which then interprets this data. Everyone is a unique assemblage of organic, psychological, and historical experiences. Although we may share many experiences in common, our associations are filtered through our individuation.

Art is a construct. Whether it is a social or cultural construct, each person will have a unique relationship to art. While individuals in our society may have evolved beyond the need for interpretation of particular organic sensory stimuli for survival, we cannot deny their rank as survival mechanisms for our ancestors. I am unwilling to presume that my concept of art is superior to any other person's concept of art (external judgment of a foreigner's internal experience). For these reasons, I am uncomfortable with evaluating or classifying any art as major or minor.

In response to Jacob's question, I believe that food is an art to those who experience it as such, and that often, the nature of the preparation, presentation, and consumption of food is inherently artistic.

My Question:
Can Telfer legitimately claim a disconnect between what food we eat, how and where it is grown or raised, how it is processed, transported, stored, marketed, obtained, and utilized by us, from what it tells us about the world and ourselves, as well as what it represents to us and others? (P 27

Reflecting on Environmental Protection Policies and Forest Management

Section 40 of the Massachusetts Forest Cutting Practices Act (MGL Chapter 132) declares that the public welfare requires the rehabilitation, maintenance, and protection of forest lands for the purpose of conserving water, preventing floods and soil erosion, improving the conditions for wildlife and recreation, protecting and improving air and water quality, and providing a continuing and increasing supply of forest products for public consumption, farm use, and for the woodusing industries of the commonwealth.

Are the goals to rehabilitate, maintain, and protect forest lands to conserve water, prevent floods and soil erosion, protect and improve air and water quality, and improve conditions for wildlife compatible with the goals of improving conditions for recreation, or of providing a continuing and increasing supply of forest products for public consumption, farm use, and for the woodusing industries of the state?

Should these policies be changed to reflect the broader goal of restoring natural forest habitat and wildlife communities or restructured to prevent long-term habitat and biodiversity losses?

Due to the interdependent nature of all life within and between ecosystems, issues of connectivity and the necessity of wildlife corridors must be considered. How do we balance conservation, preservation, or restoration of environmental systems across private and multi-use public lands? Does preservation of endangered and at risk species warrant dominance of private land by state or federal policies? How do we morally determine the merit, and fate, of invasive species in conflict with native species? How do we categorize non-native species that have been occupying the continent for 200 years? For 100 years? For 50 years? For 30 years? How do we judge and respond to invasive species whose offspring mature in 1 year? Literally hundreds of generations of some invasive species have successfully occupied our lands. At what point do we classify non-native species as native? Should we ever classify non-native species as native? Do invasive species ever occupy a niche without ousting the former occupants of that niche? If restoration requires it, how do we quantify the benefit of disturbing lands previously disturbed by anthropogenic actions?

What is the goal? Is the goal restoration to pre-anthropogenically disturbed condition? Is the goal obtaining a balance between post-anthropogenically disturbed condition in a manner that best supports the maximum environmental health and biodiversity of native habitat, flora, and fauna?

From a philosophical point of view, if this is the ethical position, is it a feasible position? If this involves extinct species and we have the technological ability to recreate extinct species, should we? How do we return the past without dislodging the present and affecting the future? What is our ethical obligation to the present? What is our ethical obligation to the future? Do we have any moral obligation to the past?

Positive, Negative, and Neutral Emotions

While reading David Huron’s book Sweet Anticipation: Music and the Psychology of Expectation, I learned that Huron used findings and techniques from modern cognitive research to expand on music theorist Leonard Meyer’s 1956 work, Emotion and Meaning in Music. Unfortunately, I was unable to delve further into Meyer's work at this time, but hope to explore this over the summer as I found Huron's work quite impressive. I was startled by Huron's belief that there are no neutral emotions, only positive or negative emotions. He refers to the positive or negative quality of emotion as valence. He defines contrastive valence as the conjecture that the hedonic value of an experience is amplified when preceded by a contrasting hedonic state. I need to research and process the concept of no neutral emotions, but I can see where evolutionarily speaking, organisms would need positive and negative response range to promote efficient survival mechanisms.

In my primary perusals I have found references to neutral emotions in The Effect of Positive Emotions on Multimedia Learning. This article's abstract states: "The study examined whether the positive emotions experienced during multimedia learning facilitate cognitive process that leads to better learning performance and satisfaction. Positive emotions were experimentally induced before a multimedia based learning by means of self-referencing mood induction procedure (positive or neutral emotions) and during the learning by the aesthetic design of the learning materials (good or neutral design). The result of the experiment shows that there is significant effect of emotions on their transfer test, mental effort investment, as well as level of satisfaction. It also indicates that positive emotions can be generated by the instructional design that may be able to affect learners’ experience and performance. The study implies that positive emotions should be considered as important factors in instructional design. Also, emotional design principles should be studied in more detail for better instructional material design."

The link to download the study is: http://create.alt.ed.nyu.edu/courses/2015/reading/Um_Song_Plass_ED-MEDIA_07.pdf

Other resources I have found that discuss the three categories of positive, negative, and neutral emotions relate to mental illness. An example is Hemispheric Differences in Recognition of Facial Expressions: A VHF-Study of Negative, Positive, and Neutral Emotions, Published in the International Journal of Neuroscience, Volume 45. Issue 3 & 4. April 1989. pages 205 - 213. It was authored by Kenneth Hugdahl et al. I will have the summer to explore what I believe to be the possible range of emotions, and determine whether or not I agree with Huron position that there are no neutral emotions.

My Question: Do neutral emotions exist in nature?

Sweet Anticipation: Music and the Psychology of Expectation

I chose this text by David Huron for my book review. Sweet Anticipation is an empirically informed and statistically based work detailing Huron’s psychological theory of expectation. This book is a 462-page analysis of the phenomenon of musical expectation, which Huron grounds in psychological, biological, and evolutionary roots. It is a natural progression built on his experimental efforts to understand how music evokes emotions. Huron breaks his work down into 17 chapters. He provides an abundance of footnotes (28 pages), a 14-page glossary, 25 pages of references, and a 13-page index and he links the notated music examples of this book to his website. Huron defines anticipation as, “the subjective experience accompanying a strong expectation that a particular event will occur; also referred to as the feeling of anticipation” and “ in Western music theory, a type of melodic embellishment in which an expected note is immediately preceded by the same pitch.” He relates this to premonition. This book is targeted for readers interested in cognitive science and evolutionary psychology, as well as in music.

Huron calls his general theory of expectation the ITPRA theory. ITPRA stands for his five categories of expectation responses: imagination, tension, prediction, reaction and appraisal. Huron posits that implicit, statistical expectations about music are directly linked to emotional response to music because they trigger basic neurobiological responses. Huron grounds his ITPRA theory in evolutionary, musicological, biological, and psychological theories.

In ITPRA, Huron suggests that an individual’s expectations about music tap into the same neural substrates as anticipation in general. Huron posits that emotions evoked by expectation involve five functionally distinct response systems: reaction responses (which engage defensive reflexes); tension responses (where uncertainty leads to stress); prediction responses (which reward accurate prediction); imagination responses (which facilitate deferred gratification); and appraisal responses (which occur after conscious thought is engaged).

According to Huron, these five response systems typically produce a complex mixture of feelings in real-world events and they contribute to the human emotional response to music. Pre-outcome responses (feelings that occur prior to an expected / unexpected event) relate to the anticipation of an event, they are comprised of imagination and tension responses. Imagining future events has emotional and intellectual aspects; the emotional aspect is designed to spur us to action. The imagination response contemplates potential future states and acts in ways that make those states more likely if they are positive, and less likely if they are negative. Imagining an outcome is a principal motivator of behavior. Without the imagination process, individuals would fail to take steps to avoid negative outcomes. Evidence suggests that imagination response induces actual emotional states while retaining awareness that the event that would lead to that state has not actually occurred.

The uncertainty of future events/experiences is an important element of anticipation, as are the knowledge of likely outcomes and their valence. Feeling uncertain about the immediate future causes Tension, which galvanizes flight, fight, or freeze - survival responses in anticipation of future events. The tension response is a more immediate physiological preparation for an imminent event and involves changes in arousal. The tension response is activated immediately before an anticipated moment of outcome, and adjusts the level of arousal and attention according to the degree of uncertainty surrounding the outcome, the significance of potential outcomes, and the estimated time before the outcome occurs.

Prediction, Reaction, and Appraisal are post-outcome responses - the three expectation processes. They are related to the outcome of events. Huron believes that chemicals in the brain are released that positively reinforce correct predictions about events and negatively reinforce incorrect predictions. He offers two separate systems of appraising events – an immediate emotional reaction process that automatically assumes the worst possible outcome based on schematic knowledge, and a slower, but more accurate cognitive process that appraises the valance and the importance of events. Working in tandem with the earlier immediate reaction process, cognitive appraisal dilutes the earlier emotional response if the evidence that earlier response was inappropriate. Cognitive appraisal of an experienced event may help avoid the possibility of being subjected to similar detrimental events in the future. Prediction responses are transient states of reward or punishment that arise in response to the accuracy of expectation. Accurate expectations are rewarded by positively-valence emotional responses, and inaccurate expectations are punished by negatively-valenced emotional responses.

Both the reaction and appraisal responses are emotional states that arise from assessments of the event itself independent of whether that event was anticipated. The reaction response is a rapid process that occurs automatically and preattentively and activates bodily actions and / or visceral responses. Reaction responses are knee-jerk reactions but are not always instinctive reflexes; they can also be learned. Appraisal responses are more considered and conscious assessments of an outcome, and need not be compatible with the reaction response.

The five processes of ITPRA prepare biologically adaptive behavioral responses that allow organisms to be optimally prepared for dangerous occurrences in the environment. Huron theorizes that musical expectations appropriate these five biologically adaptive processes, thereby producing a complex mix of feelings. He traces the psychology of expectations from the patterns of the physical/cultural world through imperfectly learned heuristics used to predict that world to the phenomenal qualia we experienced as we apprehend the world.

I found Huron’s proposals for expectancy mechanisms and their possible evolutionary origin in harmony with my own thoughts on the subject. This added to my interest in, and enjoyment of, this work. I cannot imagine it making the New York Times Bestseller List like Levitin’s This is Your Brain on Music. The nonmusician chapters were not difficult to read, but required a certain dedication and level of attentiveness to follow his thinking. His glossary and website were very important to the quality of my understanding of the musical and cognitive components of this work. I found similarities between Huron and Davies’ writing style. They both give numerous examples to illustrate their thought processes, they both restate their important points, and they both practice summarizing as a writing technique. But I believe their books were written for different audiences. Huron’s book is more technical, more evidentiary based, and supplies more empirically standardized charts, graphs, and musical notation than Davies. I would consider his overabundance of footnotes as the biggest detraction to reading this book. While they are wonderful for research purposes, they were an interruption to the flow of my reading experience, especially when I found only a citation to the reference.

Music as Play

Watching the video of Michel Camilo and his trio perform today in class, I was struck by how much enjoyment these musicians derived from their labors. We don't talk about music labor, or music as work. We play music.

Watching the expressions on their faces as they related to each other, I had the feeling that they were making fun more than they were making music. Observing their interactions during their performance, I had the sense that the process of creating music had, for them, also created community. It seemed to me, that for them, the activity of playing music together had created a bond of comradeship in some uniquely masculine form. It felt foreign. I couldn't quite grasp it. I wondered if it was a gender difference. I noticed it strangeness, but I wasn't concerned by it because even though I couldn't catalog it, it felt both positive and natural.

Their performance left me with a sense of the power music has to create cohesiveness, to create community. It strengthened my belief that music making first served some innately biological necessary evolutionary function. Clearly, some music still has the power to do that for us.

Response to Keane’s Question: Is all art derived from creative introspection and subsequent realization?

I agree that how we define art and creativity is essential for a determination of relational or independent properties. I think art minimally must reflect the incorporeal spark of its creator’s highest nature. I believe great art is the co-creative product of the mind/body/essence of the corporeal being and their environment, and if they are fortunate, of the essence of their environment.

I do not think that it is a necessary condition that all art must be derived from creative introspection and subsequent realization.

I would provide the example of arranging items found in nature to create a work of art. As beings driven to categorize the environment, we could arrange wild flowers, driftwood, rocks, shells, fungi, birds’ nests, dried leaves, moss, or any combination of myriad non-anthropogenically created objects from creative introspection and subsequent realization into works of art. But I also think it is possible to arrange those same myriad found objects by releasing one’s self from one’s corporeal constrictions and projecting one’s self relationally to said found objects. I believe it is possible for some beings, at sometimes, to be the vehicle collaborating with the less mobile, to form a work of art. I think this relational reforming can be possible with some manmade objects as well.

The question is who/what/which ones are truly organizing the form.

Response to Keane’s Question: Are there accidents that we might consider art?

There are accidents that we might consider art. Here, I would define accident as that which results from something other than a consciously aware process. A thinking creative being might produce a work of art from an unconscious or accidental process. An artist might accidentally smudge their artwork. A glassblower, potter, or metal smith might unintentionally alter the form of their piece, a composer might hit an unintended key or chord. These artists, and their audiences, could realize that their accidents resulted in artworks that were superior to their imagined, intended pieces.

A lightening strike, a flood, a landslide, a meteor, a wind storm, a blizzard, an ice storm, even a fire, are all examples of agents that have the ability to act upon the environment accidentally, but in such a manner that they could produce what we would consider spectacular works of art.

So my question is: Do you have to be a thinking, creative, sentient being to create art? Is art necessarily created solely by the agency of a living, or sentient actor? Or is art necessarily dependent upon the passive recipient of its form? Or can it be either? Again, what is art? Who defines what is art? Who defines who/what is an artist, or an agent of artistic expression. This conversation reminds me of Davies' dilemma regarding music's capacity to express emotions.

Ah, philosophy.

Response to Emily’s Question

“If you think animals are "persons", do you also consider human fetuses "persons"? What about animal eggs? Where do you draw the line?”

I consider all sentient life forms as persons. I consider embryonic forms of sentient life in one of their viable stages of evolution from embryo to self-existence as a member of their particular species also as persons.

I do not consider infertile eggs as “persons” because their particular inviable embryonic state is incapable of ever developing into a member of their species.

For me, the crux of the matter is Emily’s question, “Where do you draw the line?” I have no satisfactory answer to this conundrum, only musings. I believe the answer lies in a philosophy of a value-based hierarchy of determinants.

I believe all life forms, by nature of their very existence, deserve our respect and the right not to be abused. Yet I will kill mosquitoes, deer flies, black flies, ticks, fleas, or any other insects I find biting me, or one of my friends, or animals. I feel justified in taking the life of an insect that I believe is endangering them or me. I do not feel justified in taking the life of bees or bugs that have accidently wandered from their normal outside habitat into my home habitat, because I do not perceive their co-occupying our home as a deliberate intent on their part to do us harm. Nor do I perceive their potential to harm us, should they bite us, as significant.

Were I to think rationally about the subject, I would have to admit that the nation states of mosquitoes, horse flies, deer flies, black flies, ticks, fleas, and other biting insects are not at war with me and mine. They simply require the blood of other living beings in order for them and their offspring to survive. Their predation on us is the result of a natural evolutionary pattern that was created during the co-evolution of our species on this planet. Since our species continue sharing habitat, I need to consider that we non-insectivorous animals may be receiving some benefit from the relationship. However, I do not feel sympathy or empathy for any of them, or theirs, and referring to their progeny as offspring caused me to cringe. I do not consider them sentient beings, as I do butterflies, dragonflies, ladybugs, or bumblebees. I do not find them or their progeny cute, cuddly, or capable of inspiring any stirrings within me to grant them moral patient status, or honorary person status.

Evidently, for me, where I draw the line depends on what my relationship is with the living being. My relationship with them is dependent on my aesthetic perception of them and my belief that they are, or are not, predisposed to cause harm to me or others for whom I care. I am forced to conclude that my personal value-based hierarchy of determinant philosophy suffers a speciesist as well as aesthetic point of view.

MY QUESTIONS:
Is it unethical to view species as deserving (or undeserving) of our protection based on our aesthetic perceptions of them?
Why are we as a species prone to protect butterflies and eradicate fleas?
Is it ethical to seek to eliminate species because they have the potential to harm us or species we value?

What does it mean to "take an aesthetic interest in musical works as music"?

To "take an aesthetic interest in musical works as music" means that we confer value of any musical work as intrinsic to the work itself as music. The value of the musical work is inherent in the experience of our relationship to the piece itself, exclusive of the nature of its elements, as in its genre, or compositional aspects like melodies, rhythms, harmonies, or performance, or how they come together to form complex wholes; its value is intrinsic, not instrumental, or a means to some ends.

Davies states, “particular musical works are valued for themselves over and above their contribution to the production of the benefits of a concern with music in general” (p212). He claims the relationship between interests in particular musical works as music with interest in music in general “is to be characterized negatively” (p212).

Davies (p196-198) perceives the nature of evaluation with its inherent prescriptive function and the activity of evaluating music as leading to an aesthetic interest in musical works as music. He believes that standards of musical evaluation are conditional on the type of interest we take in musical works and the way different experiences of music and of different musical works are enjoyable. The activity of evaluation is predicated upon our descriptions of music, which are vital to our understanding and appreciation of music as an art form.

As a philosopher, Davies presents the ontological requirements for the evaluation of music, to identify the distinctive things categorized as “music,” to distinguish between a musical work and its performances, and an aesthetic interest in musical works as music. He states, “Evaluations are understood as judgments about their objects…judgments of value are subject to justification… (meritorious) evaluations can be supported by interpersonal reasons…based in uniformed responses” (197).

There is no democratic equality among the various art forms. This truth-condition applies equally to the art form known as music. Music’s artistic value and integrity require the incorporation and display of weighty compositional complexity commensurate to the same demands we impose on all art (http://www.iep.utm.edu/m/music-po.htm).

Davies writes that “The evaluation of musical works aesthetically and as music has a special status. The specialness of those standards of evaluation derives from the specialness of the interest to which they are relative. According to Davies, the value of art emerges from its affect on our approach to, and understanding of, matters that are non-artistically important for us (206). Davies posits that musical standards of evaluation enjoy privileged status because they provide the rationale for distinguishing music from sound, noise, or birdsong…” (199).

Our predilection to confer value on art is intrinsically married to our perception of the nature of artistic content as life enriching. Davies believes that without an aesthetic interest in musical works as music, it would be pointless to create or perform music.

MY QUESTIONS:
1. What constitutes a “sufficient number” of particular works?
What constitutes a “sufficient number” of occasions? (P 207)

2. Can art be separated from creativity?
If not, wouldn’t it by its very nature, affect the very fiber of our being, and therefore affect all aspects of our lives?