The dictionary defines pornography as obscene writings, drawings, photographs, or the like, esp. those having little or no artistic merit or sexually explicit pictures, writing, or other material whose primary purpose is to cause sexual arousal or the presentation or production of this material or lurid or sensational material (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pornography).
The Cultural Dictionary defines pornography as books, photographs, magazines, art, or music designed to excite sexual impulses and considered by public authorities or public opinion as in violation of accepted standards of sexual morality. And it states, American courts have not yet settled on a satisfactory definition of what constitutes pornographic material.
The Cultural Dictionary defines obscenity as behavior, appearance, or expression (such as films and books) that violate accepted standards of sexual morality. “American courts have long tried to define obscenity but without much success. Some believe, for example, that any depiction of nudity is obscene; others would argue that nudity in itself is not obscene.”
The Encyclopedia Britannica Online defines erotica as literary or artistic works having an erotic theme; especially, books treating of sexual love in a sensuous or voluptuous manner. The word erotica typically applies to works in which the sexual element is regarded as part of the larger aesthetic aspect. It is usually distinguished from pornography, which can also have literary merit but which is usually understood to have sexual arousal as its main purpose (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/erotica).
Matthew Kiernan provides the following definition of pornography: The primary goal is the elicitation of sexual arousal (p. 372), it is the sexually explicit, formulaic, and fantasy elements that constitute the pornographic (p. 375), and the standard view of pornography construes it as soliciting a certain kind of objectifying interest in those represented (p. 376). He declares, “We evaluate art works by applying a cluster of general criteria that concern the quality of the imaginative experience afforded (p. 375). He believes “pornographic works can make imaginative use of non-standard and standard formulaic elements in order to be artistically expressive and thereby afford a qualitatively high imaginative experience. Pornographic purpose does not preclude meaningful artistic aims.” (p. 376).
In Kiernan’s Footnote (#2, p. 379), he states, “Levinson characterizes pornography as essentially degrading to women, in terms of violence, domination or humiliation, whereas he does not see the erotic as thus characterized. This is either too narrow a characterization of pornography or it stretches the sense of terms like violence beyond meaningful limits.”
Jerrold Levinson claims that pornographic art is an oxymoron, that it is impossible for anything to be both pornographic and art.
The fact that the American judicial system has been unable, during its long history, to define pornography or obscenity illustrates the definitional nature of the problems associated with attempted categorizations of art and pornography.
Like art, or any artifact produced by humankind, its production and its reception are experienced in a sociocultural paradigm. Sociocultural influences of morality, ethics, and normative values are the determinant factors in the categorization of objects as pornographic, erotic, or works of art.
MY QUESTIONS:
Should works that are produced using or depicting moral patients in ways that are harmful to them be illegal?
Do we need to create a separate category for these types of works?
Monday, November 30, 2009
Monday, November 23, 2009
Are Trading Games Works of Art? A Response to Ed's Question
Though Ed's questions originated from a topic on which I am nearly absolutely ignorant, I found they led down an intriguing path.
Question 1.
Would these pieces, commissioned specifically to appear on a trading card, be considered works of art?
I think we would all agree from studies in this class and the Philosophy of Art course that some of the greatest works of art are commissioned pieces. So we cannot exclude the illustrations on Magic Cards as art because they are commissioned.
Question 2.
Would the cards on which the artwork appears be considered works of art, themselves?
I can relate this to previous chapters on art forgeries and reproductions. It is my belief that this is more a question of morality than one of art. In the case of Magic: the Gathering, the illustrations were created intentionally and specifically for reproduction as an artistic component of the game. I think the caliber of the illustrations themselves, as they appear as reproductions, should be the determinant factor as to whether or not the cards can be considered as containing works of art. I question whether one could consider the entire card as a work of art because then one is also evaluating whatever is written on the illustrated card. I am too ignorant of the game and these cards to respond strongly. If they are all similar to the card appearing on Tania’s blog, then I think the instructions appearing under the illustration might disqualify the individual cards themselves from consideration as individual works of art. I did find the quotation in this card quite clever, the reference to Borborygmus (stomach noises – growling or rumbling) with food and the boarish resemblance of the character on that card reflect the scope of knowledge of this game’s creator. I see no reason not to consider the artwork on these cards as similar to morally produced prints or reproductions of legitimate works of art – which leads to Ed’s last question.
Or the trading card game taken as a whole (be considered as works of art)?
If we take the trading card game as a whole to be a work of art, then we are necessarily including the instructions and the quotations, as well as the story and the illustrations.
Again, my ignorance of these games leaves me at a disadvantage. If the story were unalterable, as it is in literary works (which may be reprinted with new illustrations or photographs, but the literary text of the work is unchanged), then we would have to evaluate the game as a whole by assessing the artistic qualities of its parts. If the story qualifies as a literary work of art; and if the quotations and the illustrations deepen that story and are of the caliber necessary for consideration as works of art, then one still must determine whether or not the instructions are intrinsically considered as an aspect of the story AND as a result of this consideration OR on their separate merit, meet the requirements necessary to qualify as a work of art before one might consider evaluating the game as a work of art.
If the storyline itself were altered by individual players, then we would necessarily need to evaluate each new story (game) and judge the caliber of each new story (only if we had already granted work of art status to the original story and its instructions, quotes, and illustrations) in order to consider it as a work of art.
Given all this, I think we either have to conclude that these games as a whole, while comprised of artistic elements, which separately might be considered as works of art, are not works of art (as now classified and accepted), or we need to provide an additional category for works of art that allows us to evaluate, classify, and categorize them as works of art.
My Question
Are the categories or classifications of "works of art" as they currently exist, sufficient or insufficient? Do they invite or discourage art?
Question 1.
Would these pieces, commissioned specifically to appear on a trading card, be considered works of art?
I think we would all agree from studies in this class and the Philosophy of Art course that some of the greatest works of art are commissioned pieces. So we cannot exclude the illustrations on Magic Cards as art because they are commissioned.
Question 2.
Would the cards on which the artwork appears be considered works of art, themselves?
I can relate this to previous chapters on art forgeries and reproductions. It is my belief that this is more a question of morality than one of art. In the case of Magic: the Gathering, the illustrations were created intentionally and specifically for reproduction as an artistic component of the game. I think the caliber of the illustrations themselves, as they appear as reproductions, should be the determinant factor as to whether or not the cards can be considered as containing works of art. I question whether one could consider the entire card as a work of art because then one is also evaluating whatever is written on the illustrated card. I am too ignorant of the game and these cards to respond strongly. If they are all similar to the card appearing on Tania’s blog, then I think the instructions appearing under the illustration might disqualify the individual cards themselves from consideration as individual works of art. I did find the quotation in this card quite clever, the reference to Borborygmus (stomach noises – growling or rumbling) with food and the boarish resemblance of the character on that card reflect the scope of knowledge of this game’s creator. I see no reason not to consider the artwork on these cards as similar to morally produced prints or reproductions of legitimate works of art – which leads to Ed’s last question.
Or the trading card game taken as a whole (be considered as works of art)?
If we take the trading card game as a whole to be a work of art, then we are necessarily including the instructions and the quotations, as well as the story and the illustrations.
Again, my ignorance of these games leaves me at a disadvantage. If the story were unalterable, as it is in literary works (which may be reprinted with new illustrations or photographs, but the literary text of the work is unchanged), then we would have to evaluate the game as a whole by assessing the artistic qualities of its parts. If the story qualifies as a literary work of art; and if the quotations and the illustrations deepen that story and are of the caliber necessary for consideration as works of art, then one still must determine whether or not the instructions are intrinsically considered as an aspect of the story AND as a result of this consideration OR on their separate merit, meet the requirements necessary to qualify as a work of art before one might consider evaluating the game as a work of art.
If the storyline itself were altered by individual players, then we would necessarily need to evaluate each new story (game) and judge the caliber of each new story (only if we had already granted work of art status to the original story and its instructions, quotes, and illustrations) in order to consider it as a work of art.
Given all this, I think we either have to conclude that these games as a whole, while comprised of artistic elements, which separately might be considered as works of art, are not works of art (as now classified and accepted), or we need to provide an additional category for works of art that allows us to evaluate, classify, and categorize them as works of art.
My Question
Are the categories or classifications of "works of art" as they currently exist, sufficient or insufficient? Do they invite or discourage art?
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
Response to Aristotle, Benefits of Exposure to, and Overconsumption of, Certain Fiction and Non-fiction
A certain theme developed from reading the latest blogs.
I agree with Aristotle that being constantly weighed down by certain feelings may cause impediments in the quality of execution and experience of one’s daily life. I do not think that it necessarily follows that being cleansed of pity or fear leads one to become a more courageous being – though this could be a semantical issue. There are at least sometimes when even emotions putatively considered as negative, are nevertheless the appropriate response to the particular experience.
I believe we can we equally benefit from exposure to certain fictions and non-fiction, especially those exposures undertaken mindfully.
I think exposure to fictional situations offers opportunities for us to step outside of, or suspend temporarily, the thoughts and feelings that we have not yet sufficiently organized, absorbed, and holistically integrated into our evolutionary progression as a human being. The pause fiction provides can be utilized by us in various manners. We may choose to immerse ourselves in fiction to create a respite from an intense, unresolved reality; a tool used intentionally to suspend reality - as others may do through the sufficient consumption of alcohol or other mind-altering substances.
Participating in fictional experiences may allow us to shed at least some of the intensity of our (unproductive) emotions, at least temporarily. Additionally, fiction can potentially provide us with opportunities to mentally review the causational relationship between our thoughts and our emotions; and possibly extract some understanding through this process that alters the degree, or nature, of the emotion that was hampering us (from executing our life to its fullest potential).
I believe what Jamie is referring to in his blog is the unhealthy over-consumption of specific genres of non-fiction by some members of certain cultures. It appears that some Americans are obsessively substituting engagement in fictional realms in lieu of appropriately participating in, and relationally engaging with, their natural, physical world.
Fiction and non-fiction appropriately managed, may offer us situations and experiences that would otherwise be impossible for us to encounter, thereby increasing our opportunities for understanding, health, and evolution.
My Questions:
1. Do you think that some, many, or most, of the individuals who utilize Role-Playing Games do so in a healthy or obsessive manner?
2. Do you think individuals use RPGs and LARPs for the same reason others use fiction?
I agree with Aristotle that being constantly weighed down by certain feelings may cause impediments in the quality of execution and experience of one’s daily life. I do not think that it necessarily follows that being cleansed of pity or fear leads one to become a more courageous being – though this could be a semantical issue. There are at least sometimes when even emotions putatively considered as negative, are nevertheless the appropriate response to the particular experience.
I believe we can we equally benefit from exposure to certain fictions and non-fiction, especially those exposures undertaken mindfully.
I think exposure to fictional situations offers opportunities for us to step outside of, or suspend temporarily, the thoughts and feelings that we have not yet sufficiently organized, absorbed, and holistically integrated into our evolutionary progression as a human being. The pause fiction provides can be utilized by us in various manners. We may choose to immerse ourselves in fiction to create a respite from an intense, unresolved reality; a tool used intentionally to suspend reality - as others may do through the sufficient consumption of alcohol or other mind-altering substances.
Participating in fictional experiences may allow us to shed at least some of the intensity of our (unproductive) emotions, at least temporarily. Additionally, fiction can potentially provide us with opportunities to mentally review the causational relationship between our thoughts and our emotions; and possibly extract some understanding through this process that alters the degree, or nature, of the emotion that was hampering us (from executing our life to its fullest potential).
I believe what Jamie is referring to in his blog is the unhealthy over-consumption of specific genres of non-fiction by some members of certain cultures. It appears that some Americans are obsessively substituting engagement in fictional realms in lieu of appropriately participating in, and relationally engaging with, their natural, physical world.
Fiction and non-fiction appropriately managed, may offer us situations and experiences that would otherwise be impossible for us to encounter, thereby increasing our opportunities for understanding, health, and evolution.
My Questions:
1. Do you think that some, many, or most, of the individuals who utilize Role-Playing Games do so in a healthy or obsessive manner?
2. Do you think individuals use RPGs and LARPs for the same reason others use fiction?
Monday, November 16, 2009
Horror and Fiction
Even before reading Berys Gaut’s The Paradox of Horror, I disagreed with Carroll’s claim that the appeal of horrific art can be reduced to the positive feelings associated with "fascination" or "curiosity”.
Carroll claims that horror fiction is a special variation on general narrative motivation because its central features, i.e., the character, nature, origin, and weaknesses of monsters are unknowable, and as such, exist outside of our conceptual schema (p. 303). However, these exact conditions exist in fantasy and science fiction, nullifying his claim that horror fiction is a special variation on the general narrative motivation. His attempts to rationalize his theory by claiming the difference between being curious about the unknown but natural, versus curiosity of the unknown and impossible (p. 307) in which horror fictions typically traffic are also typical of science fiction and fantasy. His theory also fails to address the genre of art-horror that depicts humankind or other natural beings (sharks, dogs, octopuses, gorillas) behaving in abnormal ways.
Carroll goes on to suggest that the processes of revelation and disclosure of monsters and their properties as unknown and unknowable, is what “captures our interest and delivers pleasure”; while their inherent monstrosity simultaneously disgusts and horrifies us, thereby creating a “paradox of horror.” Carroll asserts that the disgust and horror we feel is “part of the price to be paid for the pleasure of their disclosure.” He further claims that this resolves “the paradox of horror” (304-305). He further states that “experiencing the emotion of art-horror is not our absolutely primary aim in consuming horror fictions…rather (it) is the price we are willing to pay for the revelation…of that which violates our conceptual schema…because disgust is required for the pleasure involved in engaging our curiosity in the unknown…in the processes of revelation, ratiocination, etc” (306). His above claims are false. I, and many others, routinely experience the pleasure of engaging curiously in the unknown, using processes of logical proofs, hypotheses, arguments, explanations, and revelations without experiencing disgust (philosophy courses for example). In fact, I have never had a single college course where my curiosity was not piqued on more than one occasion from exposure to the unknown (and prior to the revelation of its potential existence) was unknowable to me. Could we not accurately say that all things, to which we have not yet been exposed to, contextually or conceptually, are unknowable to us? And is it not possible, that when first exposed to the novel we can be both fascinated and curious, and experience most novelties without disgust? Everything for which we have not yet developed a referential lexicon is unknowable to us; however, disgust is neither necessary nor required to facilitate processes of curiosity, revelation, or knowing.
I agree with Gaut, there is no paradox of horror (p. 328) and “that the concepts of all emotions implicitly incorporate references to desires which are typically possessed by those experiencing the emotion” (p. 329). We evaluate emotions as possessing negative or positive qualities on a scale according to our mental rationalizations, and that all emotions are a secondary response to a thought. Our thoughts create our emotions. Or as Gaut states, “the full solution to the paradoxes depends both on a view of the emotions as evaluative, and on the recognition of how mental holism presents itself in respect of emotions, desires, and enjoyment.
My Questions:
1. Do you agree that there is a conceptual connection between evaluation and pleasure?
2. If something is pleasurable, natural (biological or physiological origins),and a
societal norm, yet it is either unattainable or absent from your life, is its absence
necessarily painful?
Carroll claims that horror fiction is a special variation on general narrative motivation because its central features, i.e., the character, nature, origin, and weaknesses of monsters are unknowable, and as such, exist outside of our conceptual schema (p. 303). However, these exact conditions exist in fantasy and science fiction, nullifying his claim that horror fiction is a special variation on the general narrative motivation. His attempts to rationalize his theory by claiming the difference between being curious about the unknown but natural, versus curiosity of the unknown and impossible (p. 307) in which horror fictions typically traffic are also typical of science fiction and fantasy. His theory also fails to address the genre of art-horror that depicts humankind or other natural beings (sharks, dogs, octopuses, gorillas) behaving in abnormal ways.
Carroll goes on to suggest that the processes of revelation and disclosure of monsters and their properties as unknown and unknowable, is what “captures our interest and delivers pleasure”; while their inherent monstrosity simultaneously disgusts and horrifies us, thereby creating a “paradox of horror.” Carroll asserts that the disgust and horror we feel is “part of the price to be paid for the pleasure of their disclosure.” He further claims that this resolves “the paradox of horror” (304-305). He further states that “experiencing the emotion of art-horror is not our absolutely primary aim in consuming horror fictions…rather (it) is the price we are willing to pay for the revelation…of that which violates our conceptual schema…because disgust is required for the pleasure involved in engaging our curiosity in the unknown…in the processes of revelation, ratiocination, etc” (306). His above claims are false. I, and many others, routinely experience the pleasure of engaging curiously in the unknown, using processes of logical proofs, hypotheses, arguments, explanations, and revelations without experiencing disgust (philosophy courses for example). In fact, I have never had a single college course where my curiosity was not piqued on more than one occasion from exposure to the unknown (and prior to the revelation of its potential existence) was unknowable to me. Could we not accurately say that all things, to which we have not yet been exposed to, contextually or conceptually, are unknowable to us? And is it not possible, that when first exposed to the novel we can be both fascinated and curious, and experience most novelties without disgust? Everything for which we have not yet developed a referential lexicon is unknowable to us; however, disgust is neither necessary nor required to facilitate processes of curiosity, revelation, or knowing.
I agree with Gaut, there is no paradox of horror (p. 328) and “that the concepts of all emotions implicitly incorporate references to desires which are typically possessed by those experiencing the emotion” (p. 329). We evaluate emotions as possessing negative or positive qualities on a scale according to our mental rationalizations, and that all emotions are a secondary response to a thought. Our thoughts create our emotions. Or as Gaut states, “the full solution to the paradoxes depends both on a view of the emotions as evaluative, and on the recognition of how mental holism presents itself in respect of emotions, desires, and enjoyment.
My Questions:
1. Do you agree that there is a conceptual connection between evaluation and pleasure?
2. If something is pleasurable, natural (biological or physiological origins),and a
societal norm, yet it is either unattainable or absent from your life, is its absence
necessarily painful?
Tuesday, November 10, 2009
Moved by Fiction
I believe the best explanation for our capacity to be moved by fiction is a Darwinian one. Walton provided a brief reference to this in Footnote 15 (p. 271). It has been well documented that young (and often mature) mammals play using objects or living creatures within their environment in representational acts. They manipulate themselves and others within their environment in ways that appear to simulate future potential experiences. The response to the imagined prey or predator is characteristically similar in nature to what their normal response would be if the situation were real. Engaging in fiction allows mobile and/or social beings the opportunity to practice and hone critical life skills in a safe environment, where errors of timing, nature of response, perception, and choice, are not fatal. The capacity to empathize with others is necessary for the formation and maintenance of healthy relationships between intelligent, sentient, social beings. From an evolutionary perspective, social skills are survival skills. Empathizing with fictional characters is a normal emotional and physiological response for intelligent, sentient, social beings.
Physiologically, we absorb virtual images from visual mediums. We construct virtual images from descriptive verbal and written communications. The more elaborate our constructions, or the sensory intensity and completeness of virtual mediums, the more intensely we experience and respond to them as if they were real in the physical sense. In this way, like other young mammals, we are playing within a range of “possible” albeit improbable encounters of objects or others within our environment. This fictional play can be preparatory in nature, an exercise in imagination, a safe opportunity to express emotion, or simply the enjoyment intelligent creatures find in playful activities.
The neurochemical pathways in the brain are the same for an image experienced in reality or one seen, or inferred from, within a virtual 3-D world. The virtual world is alive and real in some of the pathways of our minds. Our emotional and psychological responses parallel those that we would experience if the virtual images and inferences were a physical component of our existence. Our mind blurs the boundaries between the physical images perceived and the virtual images constructed in response to that which we are/have experienced. The greater the degree of submersion in the virtual imagery and our inferences, the more intensely our mind and body will respond to the experience as if it were physical.
My Questions:
1. Does your body suffer from exposure to traumatic fiction?
2. Does your body suffer from exposure to traumatic non-fiction?
3. What is gained from exposure to virtual fictional wanton violence?
4. What is lost from exposure to virtual fictional wanton violence?
5. Do the gains from exposure to virtual traumatic non-fiction outweigh the losses from
that exposure?
Physiologically, we absorb virtual images from visual mediums. We construct virtual images from descriptive verbal and written communications. The more elaborate our constructions, or the sensory intensity and completeness of virtual mediums, the more intensely we experience and respond to them as if they were real in the physical sense. In this way, like other young mammals, we are playing within a range of “possible” albeit improbable encounters of objects or others within our environment. This fictional play can be preparatory in nature, an exercise in imagination, a safe opportunity to express emotion, or simply the enjoyment intelligent creatures find in playful activities.
The neurochemical pathways in the brain are the same for an image experienced in reality or one seen, or inferred from, within a virtual 3-D world. The virtual world is alive and real in some of the pathways of our minds. Our emotional and psychological responses parallel those that we would experience if the virtual images and inferences were a physical component of our existence. Our mind blurs the boundaries between the physical images perceived and the virtual images constructed in response to that which we are/have experienced. The greater the degree of submersion in the virtual imagery and our inferences, the more intensely our mind and body will respond to the experience as if it were physical.
My Questions:
1. Does your body suffer from exposure to traumatic fiction?
2. Does your body suffer from exposure to traumatic non-fiction?
3. What is gained from exposure to virtual fictional wanton violence?
4. What is lost from exposure to virtual fictional wanton violence?
5. Do the gains from exposure to virtual traumatic non-fiction outweigh the losses from
that exposure?
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