What does it mean to "take an aesthetic interest in musical works as music"?

To "take an aesthetic interest in musical works as music" means that we confer value of any musical work as intrinsic to the work itself as music. The value of the musical work is inherent in the experience of our relationship to the piece itself, exclusive of the nature of its elements, as in its genre, or compositional aspects like melodies, rhythms, harmonies, or performance, or how they come together to form complex wholes; its value is intrinsic, not instrumental, or a means to some ends.

Davies states, “particular musical works are valued for themselves over and above their contribution to the production of the benefits of a concern with music in general” (p212). He claims the relationship between interests in particular musical works as music with interest in music in general “is to be characterized negatively” (p212).

Davies (p196-198) perceives the nature of evaluation with its inherent prescriptive function and the activity of evaluating music as leading to an aesthetic interest in musical works as music. He believes that standards of musical evaluation are conditional on the type of interest we take in musical works and the way different experiences of music and of different musical works are enjoyable. The activity of evaluation is predicated upon our descriptions of music, which are vital to our understanding and appreciation of music as an art form.

As a philosopher, Davies presents the ontological requirements for the evaluation of music, to identify the distinctive things categorized as “music,” to distinguish between a musical work and its performances, and an aesthetic interest in musical works as music. He states, “Evaluations are understood as judgments about their objects…judgments of value are subject to justification… (meritorious) evaluations can be supported by interpersonal reasons…based in uniformed responses” (197).

There is no democratic equality among the various art forms. This truth-condition applies equally to the art form known as music. Music’s artistic value and integrity require the incorporation and display of weighty compositional complexity commensurate to the same demands we impose on all art (http://www.iep.utm.edu/m/music-po.htm).

Davies writes that “The evaluation of musical works aesthetically and as music has a special status. The specialness of those standards of evaluation derives from the specialness of the interest to which they are relative. According to Davies, the value of art emerges from its affect on our approach to, and understanding of, matters that are non-artistically important for us (206). Davies posits that musical standards of evaluation enjoy privileged status because they provide the rationale for distinguishing music from sound, noise, or birdsong…” (199).

Our predilection to confer value on art is intrinsically married to our perception of the nature of artistic content as life enriching. Davies believes that without an aesthetic interest in musical works as music, it would be pointless to create or perform music.

MY QUESTIONS:
1. What constitutes a “sufficient number” of particular works?
What constitutes a “sufficient number” of occasions? (P 207)

2. Can art be separated from creativity?
If not, wouldn’t it by its very nature, affect the very fiber of our being, and therefore affect all aspects of our lives?